four
Hong Kong. It is appreciated that (apart from the necessity of making financial arrangements satisfactory to the Government of the Federation of Malaya) the limiting factors in raising additional battalions of the Malay Regiment would probably be the provision
But the
of officers, trained instructors, arms and equipment.
threat to Hong Kong is potentially so serious that it is su gested
that, if this proposal is likely to be of assistance, it should
be examined with all urgency by all concerned.
7.
Summary
(1) The most probable threats to Hong Kong are:-
(ii)
(a) An influx of refugees, many of whom might be armed.
It is imprudent to assume that this threat could not arise within the next six months.
(b) Communist inspired strikes, which might take place
at any time.
The police force is efficient but could not wholly be relied upon in the circumstances envisaged unless strongly backed by military forces. In certain circum- stances the backing required might amount to three infantry battalions.
(iii) The Volunteer Defence Force is only now being recon- stituted and even the infantry battalion will not be operational until June, 1949.
(iv) One of the regular battalions of the garrison will not be at fully trained strength until October, 1949.
(v) It is improbable that a theatre reserve can be
constituted before the end of 1949.
(vi) The forces available, or being raised, are seriously
insufficient to meet the probable threats to the security of the Colony.
(vii) No further reliable civilian security forces can be
raised, without prejudice to recruitment for the Volunteer Defence Force.
(viii) Any reinforcements must therefore come from Service
sources. It is suggested that the possibility of raising further battalions of the Malay Regiment should be urgently considered, as a means to releasing regular forces for the reinforcement of Hong Kong.