CO537-4825 — Page 21

three

Х.

5.

(v) If the refugee influx consists mainly of civilians, the

clusure of the frontier could probably be effected without bloodshed. But if bloodshed occurs serious reper- cussions would follow, e.g. an attempt to foment a general strike, which would strain security forces (already guarding the frontier) to the utmost.

(vi) The full garrison and fully recruited and trained Defence

Force would be inadequate to cope with a situation in which, with civil war being waged in the vicinity of the frontier, large bodies of armed troops of either of the opposed forces might attempt to seek asylum in Hong Kong, and large reinforcements would be needed. Bloodshed would be almost inevitable. The Governor does not at present, however, consider this a likely eventuality.

(vii) The Guvernur doubts whether fully effective closure of

the sea frontier (approximately 200 miles in length) is possible, but reasonably effective closure might be obtained by the use of Pulice patrol craft, the small number of Naval auxiliary craft available, and aircraft patrol in conjunction with canalised coast-watching service backed by mobile army patruls. He emphasises dependence upon current service commitments, provision of suitable patrol craft (not at present available), and the extent to which canalisation of water-traffic (junks, etc.) may be practicable.

The Colonial Office has reached the following conclusions:-

(a) that the military and civil forces available and being

formed would be wholly inadequate to meet a serious threat if it should develop within the next six to nine months;

(b) that it is not practicable, concurrently with

recruitment for the Volunteer Defence Force, to recruit an Auxiliary Police Force, which would in any case not be wholly reliable;

(c) that without disrupting the economic life of the

Colony (which might well suit Communist aims and should, at all costs, be avoided) the Volunteer Defence Force cannot remain mobilised for a prolonged period to meet a cold war situation, and should not be mobilised until a really serious situation develops;

(a) that any augmentation of the local forces would have to

be found from Service sources.

6. It is appreciated that the Commanders-in-Chief have indicated

that there are no further forces available in the Far East theatre

to reinforce Hong Kong, and that the Ministry of Defence has

stated that there are no additional land forces available to send

to Hong Kong from outside the theatre. Accordingly, the suggestion

which the Colonial Office makes is that the possibility of raising

additional battalions of the Malay Regiment should be urgently

considered thus freeing other forces for the reinforcement of

/Hong Kong.