00081
British garrison of Hong Kong. If in fact owing to
the limitations of the aerodrome it would not be
possible for reinforcements to reach Hong Kong for
several weeks, that was a factor which it seemed to
me should be taken into account. The Service
Officers, however, did not feel that this was a
beint.
material dirba. They said that ships capable of
carrying a substantial proportion of the re-
inforcements would always be available at Singapore.
The probability was that the troops earmarked as
reinforcements for Hong Kong would be stationed in
Singapore, and if they were there and able to move at
short notice substantial reinforcements could reach
Hong Kong by sea in from 4 to 7 days. Even if
four engined troop-carrying aircraft were in the
area, it was most unlikely that they would be
concentrated, and they would have to be collected
before troops could be moved by them. It was,
therefore, very doubtful whether the reinforcement
of Hong Kong would be quicker by air thanthe re-
inforcement of Hong Kong by sea. In any case it was
doubtful whether there would be four engined troop
carrying aircraft in the area at all, and, if they
were, their numbers were likely to be small. Finally
they felt that if there were likely to be serious
difficulties in the way of reinforcing Hong Kong in
time in the event of an emergency, it would be the
duty of the British Defence Committee, South East
Asia, with whom the primary responsibility lay, to
draw attention to the matter, and tefelt that it
could be safely left to the Committee to do so.
I did not feel able to contest this view.
ļ
12
ств
Ref.:
CO 537/1261
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