CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 560

00080

e have been trying to bring the British

Palestine Police, which is a

this kind, up to strength for a long ong recruiting drive has recently been

The figures,

es(which I obtained from

ever, were that out of 2,800 vacancies

vere

there was still, after months of effort,

2,000 unfilled. In these circumstances

I that we should enter the field with

for recruiting European personnel

Indarmerie in competition with Palestine

r any very hopeful prospect, and might

led as politically undesirable.

vill be seen from the revised draft at

▸ above views have been substantially

le drafting officers.

Their draft now

discussions in regard to the formation

le for Hong Kong should be held in

in paragraph 16 of the draft they

me extent the views which I expressed

As will be seen from No. 76 I have

t this paragraph might well be cast in

1 form and Colonel Lewis, to whom I

ed this view and said that he would

to his Director of Plans at the War

tly I gave the Service Officers at the

☺

ubstance of No. 73, and suggested to them

be desirable for the question of the

uld be required to reinforce Hong Kong

h Brigade and 1 Field Artillery

e further explored before the Joint

he Chiefs of Staff came to any

but the proposed reduction in the

/British

00081

Ref.

CO 537/1261

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngh

N

:

British garrison of Hong Kong. If in fact owing to

the limitations of the aerodrome it would not be

possible for reinforcements to reach Hong Kong for

several weeks, that was a factor which it seemed to

me should be taken into account. The Service

Officers, however, did not feel that this was a

paint material diseber. They said that ships capable of

carrying a substantial proportion of the re-

inforcements would always be available at Singapore.

The probability was that the troops earmarked as

reinforcements for Hong Kong would be stationed in

Singapore, and if they were there and able to move at

short notice substantial reinforcements could reach

Hong Kong by sea in from 4 to 7 days. Even if

four engined troop-carrying aircraft were in the

area, it was most unlikely that they would be

concentrated, and they would have to be collected

before troops could be moved by them,

It was,

therefore, very doubtful whether the reinforcement

of Hong Kong would be quicker by air thanthe re-

inforcement of Hong Kong by sea. In any case it was

doubtful whether there would be four engined troop

carrying aircraft in the area at all, and, if they

were, their numbers were likely to be small. Finally

they felt that if there were likely to be serious

difficulties in the way of reinforcing Hong Kong in

time in the event of an emergency, it would be the

duty of the British Defence Committee, South East

Asia, with whom the primary responsibility lay, to

draw attention to the matter, and tagfalt that it

could be safely left to the Committee to do so.

I did not feel able to contest this view.

سا

cm

N

Ref.:

CO 537/1261

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVËS

N

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafel.

Please note thal this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngh

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