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Ref.:

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CO 537/1260

2

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copynght

00 197

(6095) WC. 80019/5368 60m 10/45 C. & Cp. 715(8),

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

TOP SECRET

The circulation of this paper has been strictly iffed.

It is issued for the personal use of

for chalmany

Copy No.

Ref.

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the

N

restrictions Further information is pronal Archives tams and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives leaflet.

J.P. (46) 10 (FINAL)

11TH_FEBRUARY, 1916.

Circulated for the consideration of uns Chiefs of Staff

12031/4

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

HONG KONG DEFENCE PLAN

Report by the Joint Planning Steff

In anticip-tion of instructions, we have examined an appreciation by the Commander-in-Chief, Hong Kong, of the defence requirements of Hong Kong and the New Territories during the next five years.

C.-in-C. Hong Kong's Appreciation

2.

C.-in-C. Hong Kong's appreciation is based on the following factors:-

(a) A major war between the powers is unlikely for

the next five years; in any case he considers that Hong Kong is indefensible against a major power in possession of the mainland of China. b His provision is, therefore, made for defence against a major attack.

(b) The declared policy of the Chinese Central

Government is to recover the colony by diplomatic means, and in their efforts they may receive diplomatic support from the U.3.A. and U.S.S.R.

(c)

The most likely threat to the security of Hong Kong is from infiltration of lorge numbers of agents into the Chinese population to.organise civil unrest and boycott, also to carry out attacks on the European population. This threat is not a likely danger unless civil war breaks out in the vicinity of Hong Kong.

(a) A direct land assault by a Chinese army

of up to 75,000 men, led by a Southern

War Lord is a potential threet.

(e) Piracy on local shipping is a possibility

at all times.

(f) A guerilla army might march on Hong Kong

as the result of internal unrest or civil war in China.

NO.58/2 of 24th December, 1915.

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