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Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject
of supply of Nati
(g) Sporadic guerilla attacks as a result of
internal unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the ovent of civil war, however, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would be necessary to prevent the influx of armed deserters.
Policy for Dofence of Hong Kong
4. The strategical importance of Hong Kong lies in the fact that it may provide an operational navel and air base in the event of a future conflict in the Pacific. In addition, it is a British possession which has very great commercial value,
5.
The disposition of forces for garrison duties in S.E. Asia must be governed by the total forces avail-ble for the overall area, In view of the small size of the forces available in S. E. Asia, it is essential to keep permanent garrisons in outlying stations such as Hong Kong to the minimum relying on reinforcements from olsewhere within the theatre when necessary.
6.
We do not consider that under modern conditions Hong Kong could be defended against attack by a major power
We should not, in occupation of the Chinese mainland. therefore, lock up in Hong Kong forces or defences which will either not be required, or overrun and lost,
7. In the period under review a case might be made out for defending Hong Kong against the 111 armed forces which China, unsupported by any othur pover, is likely
to have available. Since, however, the J.I.C. state that the possibility of war with China in the next ten years is so remote as to be negligible, we do not consider it necessary
to allow for this eventuality in assessing the scale of forces
to be maintained in Hong Kong in peacetime.
8.
Long Term Policy. We, therefore, consider that, as our long term policy, Hong Kong should be regarded as an undefended port so far as fixed defences are concerned.
We might, however, wish to use Hong Kong as an operational naval and air base in a war in which the strategic situation makes its use desirable. We should, therefore, be prepared to instal at short notice the necessary scale of defences against air and/or naval attack from a distance. Plans and preparations necessary for the provision at short notice of a mobile scale of defences, including anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and fighter defences, should be made beforehand. The length of this notice will depend on the general international situation, and also in particular on the likelihood or otherwise of Hong Kong being required es an
No useful forecast of operational naval and ir base. this notice can at present bo given.
n1
*
C.0.S. (46) 42nd Meeting
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