00 128
:
21 times and is likely itution developed no
cks as a result of
ivil war in South China
In the event of civil
Military and police
or Wall be ucessary to
of "umed desertors.
ior modern conlitions Hong Kong
koy a major power in
and. We shoull not, therefore, ch attack, forces or defences
eð or else overrun and lost.
we, Ariso in which we should
operational naval and cir base fic, in which China was in
m. bile defences rainst rir could be moved into
Lobicu, in the samo vay n
baac from which it was
reparations being made to
inze. ucet short notico.
Poo! that our future policy it na an unofonte port acorno 1.
Ref.
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Condillions of supply of National Archives' laat
that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
cint.mal socurity, 20 a
BOLL
time.
letorrent to an attempt at
fwcza will be require1
for purison tutics in
h. cotul î'.recs available
of the aili Bize of the
i is essential to koop
atctions such as Hong Kong
orcuments from
Fry.
Kong
elsewhere
set out in the previous
Anex II C.-in-C. Hong Kong's conclusions are:-
set bracl on Hong Kong ient local protection,
suppression of piracy
olence. Certain
11 with avantage be
Hon: Hong, which would vice shoul this bo
docting;.
1
00 129
cms
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
1
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
(b) The Army garrison should be progressively reduced from its present strength of two Brigades. The first stage in this reduction should be reached by January 1947 when the strength of the local police force should be sufficient to allow a reduction to one Brigade. Reduction below this strength should be possible thereafter but this will depend upon the situation in China, and we are unable to forecast the stagus by which this reduction might be made.
(c)
detachment of half & Flying Bort squadron is sufficient air garrison for the Colony, reinforcements, if required, being drawn from elsowhere within the theatre.
The provision of fighter, ... and naval
defences are affected only by our long term policy of providing for the possible need to uau Hong Kong as an operational naval und air br.se. Those parts of C.-in-C. Hong Kong's dofence plan should, therefore, bu examined by the Defence of Bases Committee and the service Ministries.
(a) The establishment of a Joint Intelligenco
Committee at Hong Kong should be authorised.
() The question of the formation of volunteer or auxiliary Forces including a police reserve should be considered by the threo Servico Ministries and the Colonial officu.
Recommendations
9.
We recommend that:-
(a) copy of this paper should be sent to
C.-in-C. Hong Kong.
(b) The Dufunce of Fuses Committee should be
invited to recommend thy scale of defuncos to be provided for Hong Kong to implement our long term policy, taking this paper into account.
(c) The question of the formation of volunteer or auxiliary Forces including a police reservo should be considered by the three Service Ministries and the Colonial Office,taking into account any decisions that may arise on (b) above. (Signed) J.F. STEVENS
Offices of the Cabinet and
Minister of Defence, S..1.
J.H.N. POETT
J.H. EDWARDES-JONES
..
8TH APRIL, 1946.
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