00059
internal unrest or civil war in south China are most improbable. They state that whilst on local intelligence there is considered to be no
immediate threat of an attack by Chinese har Jords, the situation in China is rapidly deteriorating and renewed hostilities between Nationalists and Communiata may well be a prelude to the reappearance of war Lorde equipped with modern arms. They add that it 18 impossible to predict this eventuality more than six months ahead. on the question of the armed forces to be maintained in Hong Kong, they express the view that until such a time as the police and volunteer forces are up to strength and fully trained, the minimum garrison required for the colony 18:
2 British infantry brigades
2 Field Artillery regiments
and
ancillary troops.
Once the police and volunteer forces ure in a position
to take over their commitments and the movement of chinese troops through yowloon has ceased, however, they consider that it would be sufficient to have one of the above brigudes and one regiment of urtillery at call from S.E.A.C. reserve and not necessarily permanently stationed in the colony.
This is a very different picture from that reflected in the Joint planners' Report, and it seems to us to put the whole mutter in a new perspective. The Hong Kong Defence Committee state that the effective strength of the present garrison is not a sufficient deterrent to attack by a Chinese Mar Lord. It may not be un unfair inference that the total withdrawal of the British garrison might in itself encourage or provoke such an attack, and if
it were to develop on the scale which the Locul Committee envisage no gendarmerie could be expected to resist it successfully. We fully realise that under present conditions of manpower shortage some risks must be taken,
but
2
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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but neithe Committee this probl Service an hope you question take the been fully
South Boon be g Committee together the chief propose th stand over them.
The which ough before any prepared
that there power if Police, te these Eur Boldiers forces:
the TreaBE cost of th since the effect faḥ
be Butis
be retaine
Colony is
If we a detuile step, con fully occ
Page 70Page 71
00059
rest or civil war in South China are most
They stute that whilst on local
there is considered to be no
hreat of an attack by Chinese Lar Lords, the
1 China is rupidly deteriorating and
:ilities between Nationalists and Communists
a prelude to the reappearance of war Lorda
ih modern arms. They aad that it is
o predict this eventuality more than six
1. on the question of the armed forces to
d in Hong Kong, they express the view that'
I time as the police and volunteer forces
rength and fully trained, the minimum
uired for the Colony 18:
h infuntry brigades
Artillery regiments
and
'y troops.
ice and volunteer forces are in a position
⚫ their commitments and the movement of Chinese
gh Fowloon has ceased, however, they
t it would be sufficient to have one of the
es and one regiment of artillery at call from erve and not necessarily permanently stationed y.
a very different picture from that reflected Planners report, and it seems to us to put tter to a new perspective. The Hong Kong ittce atute that the effective strength of the ison is not a sufficient deterrent to attack
ar Lord. It may not be un unfuir inference al withdrawal of the British garrison might courage or provoke such an attack, and if evelop on the scale which the local Committee
gendarmerie cruld be expected to resist it
We fully realise that under present
f manpower shortage some risks must be taken,
but