CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 69

00058

54

24th August, 1946.

52

e for the delay in answering your

5 of the 31st July on the subject rison. The question ruised leration here, and apart from that

for a fen days.

i it, the Chiefs of stuff have

ant to defer consideration of the

all British forces from Hong Kong, ins as laid down in COS telegram

pril, namely that the garrison wi11 two brigades but be reduced to one ce of the Colony is fully re-

ting the point that it would take

ut the details of a scheme for a ace the troops, we feel that there the question of the replacement

armerie which require further

e going into the details. An

en prepared by the Hong Kong Defence

n defence questions which were

r consideration by the South Eust tee.

I enclose a copy of this

we have only recently received from

g Kong. (Would you please return

nished with it as it is our only

e form in part of a commentary on

Joint Planning Staff on the "Hong Kong

(46)10 Final Revise) dated the 8th roved by the Chiefs of staff at

he 11th April. You will see that the Committee do not accept the view that attacks on Hong Kong as a result of

internal

uguen, C CRE.

2

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Rel

Please note that this copy is supplied

CO 537/1260

ubject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

N

00059

internal unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. They atute that whilst on local intelligence there is considerʊd to be no

immediate threat of an attack by Chinese Lar Lords, the situation in China is rapidly deteriorating and renewed hostilities between Nationalists and Communiste may well be a prelude to the reappearance of war Lords equipped with modern arms. They aod that it is impossible to predict this eventuality more than six months aheud. on the question of the armed forces to be maintained in Hong Kong, they express the view that until such a time as the police and volunteer forces are up to strength and fully trained, the minimum garrison required for the Colony 18:

2 British infantry brigades

2 Field Artillery regiments

and

ancillary troops.

Once the police and volunteer forces ure in a position

to take over their commitments and the movement of chinese troops through Kowloon has ceased, however, they consider that it would be sufficient to have one of the above brigades and one regiment of artillery at call from B.R.A.C. reserve and not necessarily permanently stationed in the colony.

This is a very different picture from that reflected in the Joint planners' Report, and it seems to us to put the whole mutter in a new perspective. The Hong Kong Defence Committee state that the effective strength of the present garrison is not a sufficient deterrent to attack by a Chinese ar Lord. It may not be un unfair inference that the total withdrawal of the British garrison might in itself encourage or provoke such an attack, und if

it were to develop on the scule which the Local Committee envisage no gendarmerie could be expected to resist it successfully. We fully realise that under present conditions of manpower shortage some risks must be taken,

but

2

Ref.

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHÍVËS

restnctions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet e note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngh