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British Interests in China
4.
Shanghai, where in addition to our large commercial interests, the possession of an air staging post would be a great advantage, is much the most important of the Chinese ports. The two next most important are Tsingtao and Tientsin. The only other area in which we have appreciable interest is Canton. There are a number of other ports on the China coast at which we have commercial interests of lesser importance.
Provision of Forces
5. Naval Forces. A force of two cruisers, one light flect carrier, and three destroyers is now at Formosa and is sailing on 12 th September for Shanghai together with American naval forces. If further British forces are required, it may be possible to provide a small additional force from the British Pacific Fleet.
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6. Ary Forces, Land forces required would have to be drawn from South East Asia Command. We have considered availability of forces in another report which shows that S.A.C.S.E... has allocated one British division for Japan, Hong Kong and other Chinese ports. One brigade from this force could be made available for Shanghai if required, but its movement would be. at the expense of other planned movements in S.B.A.0.
7. Air Forces. We should be able to meet probable commitments for construction or staging post at Shanghai from SHIELD Force. Should a small operational R.A.F. contingent be necessary, it could be provided from S. E.A.C. or Hong Kong.
8.
We have included the necessary warning to S.A.C.S.E.A. regarding the proivison of forces in another roport,
Policy
9.
In view of the small land forces that could be made available, we should rely on naval forces to represent our interests unless the local situation becomes such that the provision of land forces is essential to maintain order.
It is desirable that we should participate in any American operations to Shanghai, Tientsin and Tsingtao.
Our representation at Tsingtao and Tientsin can be adequately undertaken by naval forces.
With regard to Shanghai, we should be prepared to send a small land force should a situation arise which the Chinese Government could no longer control and it appears that the situation can only be restored by land forces, and should the Americans propose to send a land force. If this is done, we consider it important that we should, initially at any rate, participate with a force sufficient to make an adequate show of strength, and that we should be satisfied that the total Anglo-American force proposed is sufficient for the tasks foreseen,
We consider that our interests at Crnton could be covered by temporary detachments from our forces at Hong Kong.
J.P. (45) 238 (Final)
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