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AG

In view of our commercial interests, we should like to be represented at other Chinese ports to which the Americans may decide to send forces. A small naval force would be sufficient in each case. We do not, however, regard this as essential and consider that our participation should depend upon the availability of naval forces at the time.

Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet, is aware of our naval requirements and is already acting accordingly in conjunction with American naval forces. In view of the undertaking we have given to the Americans, further information regarding their plans is essential bofore we can make preparations for the despatch of any land force to Shanghai.

Conclusions

10.

We conclude that:-

(a) We wish to be represented at Shanghai,

Tsingtao and Tientsin if the Americans send forces to those ports.

(b) If the situation at Shanghai appears to

require it, and if the Americans intend to send land forces there, we should be prepared to make available a maximum of a brigade group from S.H.A.C.

Our interests at Tsingtao and Tientsin

can be adequately represented by naval forces only.

(c) C.-in-C. British Pacific Fleet is aware of our naval requirements. In view of the undertaking we have given to the Americans, further information regarding their plans is essential before we can make preparations for land forces.

Recommendation

11.

We recommend that the telegram at Annex be sent to the Joint Staff Mission, repeated S.A.C.S.E.L.

(Signed)

W.L. DAWSON

A.G.V. HUBBACK

R.H. BARRY

Offices of the Cabinet and

Minister of Defence, S.W.1.

11TH SEPTEMBER, 1945.

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