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13:

have faith and trust in ourselves and let others see that we

are self-confident and true to ourselves, that faith in our power

and in our good intentions will communicate itself to others. We

must begin with ourselves and mould a spirit of confidence and

strength and not hide our light under a basket. Our prestige

has suffered greatly in Asia; it must be restored. Now is the

time for tv preparation and for the lifting of our own hearts!

No need to make half-hearted or boastful pronouncements or

promises when our tides are low. Towards the conclusion of the

War in Asia we shall be powerful and our tides will be running

strongly, and none will observe this more acutely than the

Chinese. They will then be very conscious of their own

deficiencies and of their internal dissensions.

Responsible

Chinese will see clearly that they will be in desperate need of

the goodwill and friendship of the Empire if they are to sustain

the role of a first-class and stable world-power, which events

22

have thrust upon them. If we can then convince them of our

integrity, ability and resolution to help CHINA to stability and

strength, they will desire to see us remain strong and powerful

to help her. They will want friends on whom they can rely, and

it 'should not be too difficult to convince responsible Chinese

that any weakening in our position in Asia and in the Pacific

would be to her detriment, whetherin INDIA, MALAYA or HONG KONG,

and that a policy of pin-pricks would not be helpful to her true

interests. The new World future for CHINA must be guaranteed for

her, pending rehabilitation, by the British Empire, U.S.A. and

the U.S.S.R. The progress and end of the War against JAPAN, should

give her confidence in the good intentions and reliability of the

Empire and the U.S.A. Without our help the Kuomintang Government

could hardly hope to conserve itself, and a British base at

HONGKONG would enable us to aid CHINA and watch our own interests

most effectively.

Without HONGKONG we should be much less able,

and probably less willing, to support the Kuomintang in its enormous

task of rehabilitation.

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