FO371-41657 — Page 32

Page 32

22 A

Page 32

14.

7

If the Kuomintang should adopt the view that the

rendition of HONGKONG is necessary to them as a vote of

تان

confidence and that without they could not maintain their

authority and prestige, I do not think it beyond the capacity

of our Diplomats to point out quietly and firmly to them that

the stability of the new Peace will depend on the strength and

stability of its principal supporters and that we have no

and

intention of even considering any retreat from our responsibilities

or of weakening our ability to support them. If that hint were

not sufficient, we could indicate that our withdrawal from

HONGKONG would imply a corresponding diminution of British

interests in CHINA and a re-orientation of our strategic

dispositions. We could add that whilst most anxious to see a

strong and stable CHINA emerge in the post-war period our interest

lies in securing the friendship of the new CHINA within the frame-

work of the New World Order, and that we could only watch with

sympathetic interest the form of Government which would emerge.

Being well aware of the complexities of China's internal problems

we could watch developments more effectively with HONGKONG than

i we without it and, had no intention of weakening our strength to help

the Chinese people in order to favour any political party. We

should, I think, succeed in making clear to them that our main

interest will be in establishing the new post-war World Order and that

we must concentrate on strengthening the Empire to maintain it and our

commitments, as it will be the duty of the Chinese and of our other

Allies to see that they too will be strong and dependable supporters

of the new superstructure. No progress can be made through a policy

of pin-pricks, weakening and underming the strength and mutual

confidence of Allies; any such tendencies must be abandoned and this

should be made very clear to the Chinese. The time will come when

the blue-print of the New World Order will take shape. The Allies

will then have to draft a treaty of mutual support and maintenance,

and CHINA will have to sign it and that will be the time to define

the position of HONG KONG.

underwrite formally.

Whatever is decided, CHINA must

Page 32

Page 32

Page 32