Page 272
Minutes.
Page 272
Page 272
I had promised to let Mr. Aveling have an indication of our views by tomorrow, October 14th. But Colonel Cornwall-Jones of the Joint Planning Staff rang me up yesterday afternoon to ask whether we could formulate our views at
once. I said that I was not in a position to give the considered views of the Foreign Office, as the paper had not been submitted to higher authority, but I was prepared to give the Departmental view orally if this would assist the Joint Planning Staff. I accordingly attended a meeting yesterday afternoon and took the following line, making it clear that my views were personal.
In the first place I did not agree with Sir Geoffrey Northcote's conclusion (v) that demilitarisation would not make a Japanese attack on Hong Kong more likely and that the present military strength of the colony was no deterrent to the Japanese. I said that Japanese action against Hong Kong might not take the form of an attack; it might take the form of a blockade or even of a policy of pinpricks. Experience elsewhere showed that the Japanese were likely to be deterred from such measures if they involved a risk of a clash with our armed forces and therefore a risk of war. was unlikely therefore, so long as British forces remained at Hong Kong, that the Japanese would take serious measures against the colony unless they were in any case resolved to go to war with us. On the other hand if we withdrew our troops the colony would be at the mercy of the Japanese who might be encouraged to feel that any measures which they might take would not involve the risk of war.
It
As regards Sir Geoffrey Northcote's conclusion (vi) that the United States Government might conceivably be more inclined to guarantee Hong Kong if it were an open undefended port, I said that I could not understand this; the sub-Committee were of the same opinion.
D
and
how
I stressed the point that although the strategical value to us of Hong Kong might be diminished, it might have a considerable value to Japan who, if in occupation of it, would have no serious threat from the mainland; and that it seemed important to deny it to Japan as long as possible.
The crux of the whole question was whether the demilitarisation of Hong Kong at this stage would be a greater blow to our prestige than a short and unsuccessful defence involving large casualties. This was a matter of opinion on which it was difficult for me to express a decided view. I could only indicate what the effects of withdrawal now were likely to be. Withdrawal would undoubtedly be a most serious blow to our prestige. It would be a great encouragement to Japan who would regard it as the first fruits of the new pact and as a signal for an advance on the next objective. It would correspondingly discourage the Chinese and would, I thought,
have /
Page 272
Page 272
NOTHING
TO
BE
WRITTEN
IN
THIS
MARGIN.