FO371-24688 — Page 271

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When we were discussing the withdrawal of troops from Shanghai, certain members of the War Office advocated that it should be a second Calais, in a town which does not belong to us and where there were no defences at all. We disagreed then, but I am afraid I hold the view that Hong Kong should, if necessary, be a second Calais whatever hardships it may have to endure. By demilitarising Hong Kong we should achieve more for the Japanese plan than even the Japanese in their wildest hopes could achieve. We tend to forget that the Japanese have for many years past held our fighting capacity in supreme contempt. This war in the air and on the sea has, we hope, given them cause for doubt. But on land we have yet to achieve a victory which will influence them. Wheh British guns begin to kill Japanese troops the natural caution of the Japanese will begin to reassert itself. If we recede before the threat of military action against, not an International Settlement in Chinese territory, but one of our own Crown colonies, we shall not only deal an almost irretrievable blow to our own prestige in the Far East, but we shall encourage a more

If we rapid advance on the next objective. are to play for time, which in the lamentable state of our defences is necessarily our main object, we shall achieve success only by maintaining a firm front, and the demilitari- sation of Hong Kong will certainly not serve that purpose.

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The only circumstances in which demilitari- sation would be justified would be if the United States were to suggest it. I think we should now frankly explain to the United States the state of our defences at Hong Kong. suppose it is too much to hope that they might have an odd anti-aircraft gun in the neighbourhood which we could beg, borrow or buy. But by explaining to the United States how we stand we shall confront them with the position they will be in if they watch the annihilation of Hong Kong with indifference. If, as a result of their own unpreparedness, they prefer that we should demilitarise rather than that they should have to go to war over it, well and good. I do not think that we should suggest demilitarisation, but we should so put the case to them that they can make the suggestion if they wish. In the meanwhile, without by any means taking a lighthearted view of the situation, I submit that we should determine to resist whatever the consequences, and to imbue our people at Hong Kong with a spirit entirely contrary to that which prevails in this paper.

Strang

Нашит

11th October, 1940.

This minute was written after

discussion with me

"Hohly Clarke;

4/10

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