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the stations fixed upon could not be worked at all in case of attack, owing to their exposed position, smoke, &c.
Of the fifty-five signalling stations shown in the Tables, pp. 30-32, it appears intended to work no less than twenty-eight with two men, and six with one man. Dependence could not be placed on these stations, as two men are not sufficient for working a station efficiently.
The expediency of establishing signal stations at El Zara, Wardia, and Ben Warrat, in advance of the west land front, is doubtful. Unless they are to be withdrawn at night (which, judging from the apparatus for night signalling allotted to them, is not contemplated), the personnel told off to work them appears to be inadequate.
4. The orders to the district signalling officer on p. 29 will require revision in the light of the following remarks:-
As regards paragraph 1, the exact status of the district signalling officer at Malta is not known, but it would appear to be stretching a point to describe him as being responsible at all times for communication throughout the island by military telegraphs and telephones.
As regards paragraph 2, the proposed assumption by this officer of the control of the civil telegraph and telephone systems of the island on the outbreak of war appears to be a measure of very doubtful expediency, and one that would not improbably tend more to friction with the local Postal authorities than to the creation of an efficient telegraphic and telephonic service.
As regards paragraph 4-how the peace communications are to be supplemented in time of war should be worked out beforehand, so that the District Signalling Officer may know exactly how to proceed on mobilization. These remarks may be held to apply also to para- graphs 5 and 6, the "look-out" stations, which it is intended to establish, being fixed definitely beforehand, the personnel for their occupation laid down, and the corps whence the men would be drawn named.
5. As far as can be judged from reference to the-
(i.) Orders to the District Signalling Officer on p. 29;
(ii.) Orders to the C.R.E. on p. 23;
(iii.) Table (C) on p. 27 ;
it does not appear to be in contemplation to extend the telegraph, or to increase the number of wires already existing between different points, on mobilization, and this may possibly be the reason why all information and detail with reference to the existing telegraph and telephone service has been omitted from the Scheme.
It would be of advantage if a short concise account of the latter were included in the next revision showing the numbers of N.C.O.'s and men permanently employed in the telegraph and telephone offices in Malta and Gozo with their corps and telegraph grading, and how many of them are to remain in their present positions on outbreak of war, and how many are to return to the fighting ranks.
From the Estimate of Probable Expenditure for the Year 1895-96 for Telegraph, Telephone, and Signal Stations at Malta, it would appear to be in contemplation to employ thirty N.C.O.'s and men permanently throughout the year on telegraph duty, but no mention of the fact is made in the Scheme, nor does any deduction appear to have been made on account of this service from the fighting strengths of the different units in Table (A) on pp. 19-20, which shows the distribution of the garrison of the fortress on mobilization.
Similarly, no deduction has been made in the case of the signallers, 160 in number, to whom reference has been made in a previous paragraph of these remarks. The number of men taken from the ranks for these two services would be close on 200, and in this connection the question suggests itself, whether it would not be better to employ a greater number of Maltese as telegraph clerks throughout the island.
That some are so employed appears from the list of telegraph employés forwarded by G.O.C. with "Estimate of probable Expenditure for 1895-96,'
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