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31st August, 1889, to General Officers Commanding fortresses at home.* Those remarks apply still more forcibly to the present Scheme, and the Colonial Defence Committee can only re-emphasize them. So long as the principles laid down by the Adjutant-General remain unaltered, there is no option but to follow the lines therein indicated. As pointed out in the Remarks of 1893, it has been found in similar cases perfectly practicable to place an officer in supreme com- mand of a section of the Defence with the control of the troops of all arms in that section, and consequently having under him the artillery officer who commands and controls the artillery fire of the section, and there seems to be no sufficient reason why the same practice should not hold good at Malta. This is the chief point which calls for reconsideration at the next revision.

2. Though the first method of attack, described under Strategical Con- ditions, p. 10, might, whether wisely or unwisely, be attempted by an enemy, and though the third method of attack, viz., a torpedo-boat raid on the harbours of Valetta, is perhaps of all forms of attack the most probable, the second method of attack by a powerful land force disembarked outside the defensive lines, accompanied by simultaneous naval blockade or demonstration against the sea-front, is practically the only form of attack that would promise any decisive result towards the capture of the fortress. This, however remote the contingency of such an attack may be, points to the necessity for an effective land defence, and while it is, of course, desirable that the forts and batteries on the sea-front should be sufficiently manned, this must not be done at the expense of an undue depletion of the landward defence. According to Table (A), pp. 19 and 20, on the first mobilization, and pending reinforcement from England and Gibraltar, no less than 907 infantry of all ranks are allotted to assist in manning the works and guns on the sea-front.

It seems questionable whether on first mobilization, and before the particular nature of attack to be met has declared itself, the land defence should be weakened to this extent, as, in case of the second form of attack, an enemy, if he lands at all, will land in force, and the land force, even at its full numbers, is little enough for the defence of the north-west front. It is therefore suggested for consideration whether, pending the arrival of the artillery reinforcements, it might not be feasible to diminish the numbers of infantry detailed to assist the working of the guns without materially interfering with the efficiency of the seaward defence.

Also, it is desirable that a plan of action should be determined in the event of the enemy forcing the north-west front. It is suggested that, in addition to completing the measures deemed necessary to strengthen it, a second position immediately covering the cities and harbours from close attack should be selected in case of retreat, and its method of occupation be worked out.

3. The signalling arrangements, as proposed in the Scheme, are on too elaborate and extensive a scale.

It is noticed that it is proposed to establish no less than fifty-five different signalling stations, to which the personnel allotted consists of 54 gunners and 106 infantrymen (see Table, p. 33). As, according to Table (A), pp. 19-20, no less than 907 infantrymen have to be employed in assisting to work the guns, owing to the deficiency of gunners, it seems illogical to employ 54 men of the Royal Artillery as signallers.

In addition to the fifty-five signalling stations mentioned above, it is proposed, in case of attack, to create five additional stations in the eastern land section, for which the necessary personnel would have to be found. Many of

* "The object of introducing the Sectional system is not only to assimilate our peace organiza- tion to that which must prevail in war, but also to give greater cohesion and unity to the working of the different arms, corps, and departments towards their common end-the effective protection of the fortress. There is a certain tendency at present, for the different branches of the defence of a fortress to be looked upon as separate matters instead of as parts of one general whole, for its Artillery defence to be considered as an Artillery matter solely, its Submarine Mine Defence as solely for the Royal Engineers, its Infantry defence questions as to be dealt with by the Iufantry alone, and so on.

The result is that, while all work zealously at their own special functions, each is ignorant of the general lines upon which the defensive plans of the other are based. It is the object of the appointment of Sectional Commandants to do away with this separation of arms, and to gather together for each section all the different means for its defence into the hands of one officer, who, acting under you, will be able to take a comprehensive view of its general condition and organization, and to impart to its defensive arrangements greater unity than there is reason to believe exists at present." (Extract from letter of Adjutant-General to the Forces to General Officers Commanding fortresses at home, dated 31st August, 1889, Gen. No. 5/7389.)

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