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the
(iii) Our examination has, however, indicated that. assuming
co-operation of Turkey, successful attack on the Caucasian oilfields might in time result in the economic and the military collapse of Russia, which in turn would deprive Germany of any hope of supplies from that source.
(iv) At sea, war with Russia would result in material increase in the naval The strength of our enemies, particularly in submarine forces. increased threat to Allied sea communications and the necessity for some redistribution of our naval force would add to our difficulties, but it should be within the Allied naval capacity to overcome them. (v) On land and in the air, we should be exposed in war with Russia to serious threats in India, Iraq and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields, with inadequate means of meeting them. During 1940 we cannot be sure that our military strength will be sufficient to meet even the contingencies which may arise in war with Germany alone. Moreover, in all operations which may be considered, account has to be taken of the attitude of Italy. Consequently
(a) Land forces on an adequate scale to counter Russian threats in the Middle East cannot be found until late in 1940, except at the expense of the British Expeditionary Force in France or by accepting risks vis-à-vis Italy.
(b) Anti-aircraft units which would be necessary for the defence of the Anglo-Iranian oilfields and which would be demanded by India cannot be provided during 1940 except at the expense of Home Defence.
(c) Fighter aircraft for the defence of India and Abadan would not be available unless the attitude of Italy justified their with- drawal from Egypt and they had not been committed to the defence of Turkey or Northern Iraq.
On the other hand it must be remembered that Russia has to maintain forces widespread through the length and breadth of the vast territories of the U.S.S.R.
(vi) It is essential that we should be in a position to attack the oilfields at the earliest possible moment after the outbreak of hostilities. If we cannot do so, or if our attacks are not successful, the threats to our interests may continue indefinitely. If we are to have a reasonable chance of attacking the oilfields effectively with British forces, it will be necessary to transfer three long-range Blenheim squadrons from Home to the Middle East. The full implications of this move are set out in paragraph 46 above.
(vii) Without Turkish or Iranian co-operation, we cannot attack the
Caucasian oilfields at all except by infringing territorial rights.
Richmond Terrace, S. W. 1,
March 8, 1940.
(Signed)
C.L.N. NEWALL
DUDLEY POUND
EDMUND IRONSIDE
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