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(xxiv) The area is heavily defended against air attack. There must therefore remain an element of doubt as to our ability to achieve the wholesale destruction of all refineries. It would be most important to under- take the operations at the earliest possible moment so as not to give the Russians time to improve the defences still further, possibly with German help (paragraphs 43–44).

(xxv) The only British squadrons now in the Middle East which could reach the Caucasus are not suitable for day operations against the Russian defence and could not alone achieve effective results. Such results could only be achieved by Mark IV Blenheims, which would have to come from the United Kingdom (paragraph 45).

(xxvi) The transfer of three squadrons of Mark IV Blenheims from home to the Middle East could be effected by the end of April if prepara- tions were put in hand now and if the following implications were accepted :-

(a) The air striking force for our major air plans or for the attack on a German invasion through the Low Countries would be correspondingly reduced.

(b) Important developments such as the provision of fighter squadrons for Scapa, expansion of the bomber force, trade defence squadrons, and re-equipment generally, already delayed by preparations for a certain operation, would be further retarded (paragraphs 45–46).

(xxvii) Air attack of the Caucasus area could not be carried out without casualties to civilians. Our existing rules governing air bombard- ment would have to be modified (paragraph 50).

(xxviii) There is a possibility that we might be able to operate the bomber squadrons now in the Middle East from Teheran, but since we cannot rely on Iranian co-operation, plans cannot be framed on this basis (paragraph 48).

(xxix) The French have a project for attacking the Caucasus with long-range bombers operating from Syria. This is now under discussion (paragraph 49).

(xxx) If we could obtain access to the Black Sea, naval action against the Russian sea communications could interrupt the distribution of a considerable proportion of the oil from Batum and thereby add to the congestion in the Baku area and on the railways. Carrier raids into the Black Sea against Batum and Tuapse might prove practicable, but it would not be possible to attack the vital Baku area by this means (paragraphs 51-52).

(xxxi) If the Turks were at war with Russia, they might undertake operations on land against Batum, possibly in conjunction with a rising of the Armenian and Georgian tribes (paragraph 53). (xxxii) Apart from operations in the Black Sea, naval action in this area would be confined to contraband control over Russian sea-borne trade through the Ægean (paragraphs 38-39).

Far East.

(xxxiii) Action would be limited to submarine patrols and to cutting off supplies through Vladivostok as effectively as possible (para- graph 54).

Broad Conclusions.

56. The broad conclusions to be drawn from the above appreciation are as follows:-

(i) The risk of initiating war with Russia would be acceptable only if it led to a result which might cause the early defeat of Germany. Capture of the Galivare orefields would be a case in point.

(ii) As a result of our present examination we consider that there is no action which we could take against Russia which would bring about the early defeat of Germany.

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