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General.
13
Methods by which Russia could Strike at Allied Interests.
(v) One of the greatest dangers would be Russian subversive propaganda.
This calls for active counter-measures (paragraph 11).
Northern Europe.
(vi) The Russian threat in this area would be purely maritime and could be met, but the loss of our supplies of Swedish iron ore, should the Russians reach the Atlantic seaboard, would be serious (paragraph 12).
Near and Middle East.
(vii) Russian submarines might attempt the passage of the Straits to attack our communications in the Mediterranean. Counter-measures would be much facilitated by Turkish co-operation, without which the threat might possibly become serious (paragraph 14).
(viii) It would be contrary to Russian interests to initiate action which would disturb the neutrality of Turkey or Iran. But if war broke out between Great Britain and Russia, and Turkey or Iran became involved, Russia might undertake limited land operations in northern Iran and air operations against objectives in Iraq and Iran. The spread of the war to the Balkans is not likely to result from a Russian attempt to strike at the Allies, and has therefore not been considered in this paper (paragraphs 13 and 16). (ix) As soon as hostilities broke out we would have to provide for the security of the Anglo-Iranian oilfields and Basra. Three brigades, some anti-aircraft artillery, and fighter aircraft would be necessary for this. Of these, only the three brigades could definitely be made available early in 1940 (paragraph 19).
(x) The Russians might overrun the northern fringe of Iran, perhaps as far as Tabriz. In addition the whole of Iran might be thrown into a state of chaos by air bombardment. This would no doubt have repercussions in Iraq where also considerable disorder might result from air bombardment. To deal with this situation and to maintain our communications through Iraq much larger forces would be necessary. So far as can be foreseen at present these larger land forces should be available in the Middle East and India late in 1940, although their employment would depend upon the progress made in the provision of maintenance requirements. The possibility of providing the requisite forces earlier than this date is under urgent examination with the Government of India. The provision of adequate air forces and anti-aircraft units would, however, be a matter of great difficulty (paragraphs 17-20).
India and Afghanistan.
(xi) Soviet land and air action in this area is to be expected as soon as war
breaks out (paragraph 21).
(xii) With the land forces normally located in the Central Asian Military district, Russia could rapidly occupy the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan. A further land advance on India could be under- taken by Russia only as a long-term project, if at all (paragraph 22). (xiii) With the air forces now located in the Central Military district, Russia could bombard objectives in any part of Afghanistan and some military centres in the North-West Frontier of India. By reinforcing the above air force with a few long-range bombers, Russia could attack Indian cities as far as Lahore and Quetta (paragraph 23).
(xiv) These attacks, if successful, would create grave disorders amongst the tribes of Afghanistan and the North-West Provinces of India; might cause considerable damage in the crowded cities of the North-West of India; and would certainly result in acute internal security problems (paragraph 24)
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