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(xv) Afghanistan would undoubtedly call for assistance on land and in the air. There would be no possibility of providing air assistance; but the Indian Government might be able to assist Afghanistan by despatching small land forces to Afghanistan. We recommend that the Government of India be invited to examine as a matter of urgency the problem of giving aid to the Afghan Government, including the provision of some land forces for Afghanistan. Our inability to give effective aid to Afghanistan would have unfortunate but unavoidable repercussions on our relations with the Afghan Government and on our prestige in the Moslem world, to offset which it would be important to strike against Russian vulnerable points elsewhere at the earliest possible moment (paragraphs 25–27).

(xvi) The demand by India for reinforcement by fighter aircraft, and by anti-aircraft artillery would be difficult to resist. Even if the Italian attitude justified their release, the fighter squadrons in the Middle East are already earmarked for the defence of Turkey and Iraq. Substantial reinforcement from the fighter or anti-aircraft resources of Great Britain and France would clearly be undesirable (paragraph 28).

(xvii) India might cease to be a potential source of supply of reinforcements for other theatres of war, but she should be able to maintain her position unaided except in respect of anti-aircraft defences (paragraph 29).

Far East.

(xviii) A limited submarine threat must be anticipated against trade which, however, is not vital. German surface raiders might make use of Vladivostok as a base, thus avoiding passage through the dangerous North Sea area. Japan might adopt a more forward policy to the detriment of Allied interests, or might compromise with the Allies in order to improve her position vis-à-vis Russia.

Methods by which the Allies could Strike at Russia.

Northern Europe.

(xix) Russia's seaborne trade would be interrupted and her northern bases

could be subjected to seaward attack (paragraphs 33-34).

(xx) On land and in the air we could not strike directly at Russia, but if we gained access to Scandinavia we might defeat any Russian attempt to reach Narvik and thereby impose an added strain upon the Russian military effort. Moreover, successful operations in this area, if carried out before the Gulf of Bothnia is ice free, would secure Galivare (paragraph 35).

Near and Middle East.

(xxi) It is in this area alone that the Allies could strike at Russia effectively; namely, by attacking her oil supplies in the Caucasus. It is, however, impossible to carry out this attack unless we first obtain Turkish or Iranian co-operation or infringe their territorial rights (paragraph 41).

(xxii) Provided the problem of Turkish or Iranian neutrality could be over-

come, the best method of attack would be by air.

(xxiii) The objectives for air attack comprise the groups of refineries at Baku, Grozni and Batum. The destruction of these might be achieved by sustained operations over several weeks, by at least three bomber squadrons (paragraph 43).

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