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There is nothing the Russians can do on land or in the air directly to embarrass us in the Far East. The fact that we were at war with Russia might, however, cause Japan to pursue a more forward policy in the Far East, to the detriment of Allied interests. The extent to which Japanese action might cause us embarrassment would depend upon the attitude of the United States. On the other hand, Japan might attempt to exploit the situation by compromising with us in order to improve her position vis-à-vis Russia. Our diplomatic action should be directed to bring about this latter course.
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III. METHODS BY WHICH THE ALLIES COULD STRIKE AT RUSSIA.
32. We now turn to consider the ways in which the Allies could bring pressure to bear upon Russia under the following headings :--
Naval Action.
Northern Europe.
Near and Middle East.
Far East.
NORTHERN EUROPE.
33. Our existing dispositions for exercising contraband control against Germany in northern waters would enable us to interrupt Russian seaborne trade outside the Baltic, including the limited trade which passes through Russia's northern ports.
34. Petsamo, Murmansk and Archangel would all provide suitable targets for carrier-borne air attack and for offensive mining and submarine action. Similarly Narvik, if the Russians should reach that port, would be exposed to attack from the sea and might be harried incessantly. Naval raids designed to destroy shipping and port facilities might well prove practicable on any of the above harbours, although the consequences to Russia would not be serious.
Land and Air Action.
35. Allied intervention through Scandinavia might provide us with air bases from which we could reach Russian territory. It would, however, be unsafe to assume that we could attack important objectives such as those at Leningrad, since we should be committed to intensive operations with Germany. For this reason we could not count on striking a direct blow at Russia in this area, but if the Soviet decided to extend her advance beyond Finland to the Norwegian coast at Narvik, Allied support in the Scandinavian countries would greatly increase the strain on Russia in her attempt to carry out the project. Intervention in this area would also hasten the defeat of Germany if we could occupy the orefields at Galivare, but it would be unsound to hold forces available for this purpose once it becomes clear that we should be unable to reach Galivare before the Gulf of Bothnia is ice-free.
Naval Operations.
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST.
36. The attitude of Italy would greatly influence our ability to conduct naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea against Russian seaborne trade and naval forces.
37. In the first instance, we should exercise contraband control over Russian seaborne trade passing through the Egean. This would include the important inter-coastal traffic between the Black Sea and the Far East, and our control would be greatly facilitated by Turkish co-operation with the consequent closing of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.
38. Later, assuming Turkish co-operation and that we had been able to concentrate the necessary naval and air forces, we could operate against Russian forces and sea communications in the Black Sea. Interruption of the
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