CAB80-8 — Page 269

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British Support to Afghanistan.

25. If Russia were to take action on the lines described above, it is almost certain that the Afghan Government would appeal to us for assistance both on land and in the air.

26. The forces at the disposal of the Government of India are not designed to meet the commitment of operations in aid of the Afghan Government, nor does. any plan for such operations exist; nevertheless, it would be important to assist the Afghan Government and to enlist the sympathy of the Afghan tribes and the tribes in British territory. We recommend that the Government of India should be invited to examine, as a matter of urgency, the question of giving help to the Government of Afghanistan, and to consider the provision of some forces for despatch into Afghanistan. It should be realised that no fighter aircraft or anti-aircraft units would be available in India.

27. It must be recognised that, if we could not provide any direct assistance to Afghanistan, either on land or in the air, it would have most unfortunate results on our relations with the Afghan Government and most undesirable repercussions on our prestige in the Moslem world in general. The fact remains, however, that, unless the Indian Government can find forces for despatch to Afghanistan, there would be nothing in the first instance that we could do in direct support of that country. It would be, therefore, of more importance that we should take action against Russia's vulnerable areas elsewhere at the earliest possible moment.

Air Defence of India.

28. Air defence resources in India at present consist of one anti-aircraft battery, and two bomber squadrons are being supplied with fighter conversion sets. Air attack would create an outcry in India for fighter protection and for anti-aircraft guns, and in the circumstances it might be politically impossible to leave India without any fighter protection at all. We might therefore be compelled to strengthen India's fighter defence sufficiently at least to act as a deterrent to Russian air attacks. The fighter squadrons in Egypt are already earmarked for the defence of Turkey and Iraq so that, even if the attitude of Italy justified relaxation of defence measures, the release of these squadrons might only be possible at the expense of one or the other of these Allies. Substantial reinforcement from the fighter and anti-aircraft resources of Great Britain and France would clearly be undesirable.

Land Defence of India.

29. Apart from the lack of fighter and anti-aircraft defences, India should be able to deal with tribal unrest and internal security with the resources now at her disposal. The strain on her industrial capacity, however, might be heavy and result in her inability to act as a potential source of reinforcement for other theatres of war.

FAR EAST.

30. Hostilities with Russia would not result in any serious disturbance of the strategic equilibrium in the Far East. The small Russian surface naval forces based on Vladivostok cannot be regarded as any menace to our sea communications. The submarine force, however, which includes some large submarines, represents a more serious potential threat and some anti-submarine reinforcements to our China Fleet would be desirable, but it would not be easy to spare these from home waters. Although the China Coast is within range of submarines working from Vladivostok, the trade in that area is not vital to us and it may be necessary to accept some risks. To inflict any real damage on our seaborne trade in the Far East, Russian submarines would have to operate in the Singapore area. This is almost at their extreme range from Vladivostok, which would make it very difficult for them to sustain the attack. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the standard of Russian submarine training is equal to such long distance patrols.

It is possible that German surface raiders might make use of Vladivostok as an occasional base for repairs and rest. Although Vladivostok is some 3,000 miles from any important focal areas of British trade, this use of it would avoid passage through the dangerous North Sea area.

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