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Some land forces might be required for the protection of aerodromes if we were to operate from Northern Iraq, and this question is now under examination by the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. Until late in 1940. such forces would have to be found either from the three Brigades earmarked for Basra and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields or from other troops in the Middle East. If it proved possible to operate only from aerodromes in Syria or Eastern Anatolia, the French or Turks would presumably provide the necessary protection.
46. The importance of early and effective operations against the oil installations in the Caucasus in the event of war with Russia might well be so great as to justify the inevitable risks involved elsewhere. We have, however. thought it right to set out the censequential effects in some detail, so that a decision may be arrived at with full knowledge of the implications.
47. There is, of course, the possibility that Iran might be engaged as an ally on our side. In this event we should presumably be able to make use of Teheran as an advanced aerodrome. By this means it should be possible, subject to certain technical difficulties which are now being examined, to reach Batum and Baku with the existing Mark I Blenheim squadrons in the Middle East. The advantages of this would be obvious. It is, however, impossible to plan on this basis, since we cannot be certain what the attitude of Iran will be when the time comes.
48. The French have a project for attacking the Caucasus from bases in Syria with long-range bombers drawn from Tunisia. We have not the details of this plan, but the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the Middle East has been instructed to obtain them, and to ensure the necessary co-ordination with our plans.
49. We should point out that the bombing of the oil installations in the Caucasus would certainly involve considerable loss of civilian life. Our existing rules governing air bombardment would, therefore, have to be modified. It is clear, however, that Russia's action in Finland has given ample justification for these operations. The reaction of Germany, which cannot be predicted, must not be lost sight of, since the necessary diversion of forces to the Caucasus would reduce our capacity to strike at Germany.
Naval Action.
50. Naval action in the Black Sea could strike at Russian oil supplies by interrupting the distribution by sea from the ports of Batum and Tuapse, which represents some 5,000,000 tons per annum. The Caspian route and the railway from Baku are believed to be incapable of standing any appreciable increase of oil traffic. Consequently, congestion would be likely to occur in the Baku area and the transportation system generally would be severely strained. Moreover, control in the Black Sea would stop the export of Russian petroleum to Germany.
51. Carrier-borne air attack would not be practicable, since, to achieve results, sustained air operations over the Baku area would be required. Aircraft carriers could not remain for prolonged periods in the vicinity of Russian shore-based bombers, and the slow Fleet Air Arm aircraft are unsuited to face the large number of Russian fighters maintained in the area.
Land Attack.
52. The Turks are reported to be taking an active interest in Trans- Caucasia, where there are many inhabitants of Turkish origin. If they were at war with Russia, they might undertake operations on land against Batum, especially if the anti-Soviet elements in Armenia and Georgia were to co-operate with them by rebellion and sabotage.
FAR EAST.
Action against Russia in the Far East.
53. It would not be practicable to undertake operations against Russian naval forces based at Vladivostok, other than by submarine patrols, until the attitude of Japan had been clarified, and until some considerable liquidation of
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