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26. It must be recognised that the fact that we could not provide any substantial direct assistance to Afghanistan, either on land or in the air, might have unfortunate results on our relations with the Afghan Government, and most undesirable repercussions on our prestige in the Moslem world in general. The fact remains however that, unless the Indian Government could see their way to provide the small mobile force referred to above, there would be literally nothing that we could do. To offset this it would be all the more important that we should take action against Russian vulnerable areas elsewhere at the earliest possible moment.
Air Defence of India.
27. Air defence resources in India at present consist of one anti-aircraft battery, and two bomber squadrons are being supplied with fighter conversion sets. Air attack would create an outery in India for fighter protection and for anti-aircraft guns, and in the circumstances it might be politically impossible to leave India without any fighter protection at all. We might therefore be compelled to strengthen India's fighter defence sufficiently at least to act as a deterrent to Russian air attacks. The fighter squadrons in Egypt are already earmarked for the defence of Turkey and Iraq so that, even if the attitude of Italy justified relaxation of defence measures, the release of these squadrons might only be possible at the expense of one or the other of these Allies. Substantial reinforcement from the fighter and anti-aircraft resources of Great Britain and France would clearly be undesirable.
Land Defence of India.
28. Apart from the lack of fighter and anti-aircraft defences, India should be able to deal with tribal unrest and internal security with the resources now at her disposal. The strain on her industrial capacity and on her supply of trained man-power, however, might be heavy and result in her inability to act as a potential source of reinforcement for other theatres of war.
FAR EAST.
29. Hostilities with Russia would not result in any serious disturbance of the strategic equilibrium in the Far East. The small Russian surface naval forces based on Vladivostok cannot be regarded as any menace to our sea communications. The submarine force, however, which includes some large submarines, represents a more serious potential threat and some anti-submarine reinforcements to our China Fleet would be desirable, but it would not be easy to spare these from home waters. Although the China Coast is within range of submarines working from Vladivostok, the trade in that area is not vital to us and it may be necessary to accept some risks. To inflict any real damage on our seaborne trade in the Far East, Russian submarines would have to operate in the Singapore area. This is almost at their extreme range from Vladivostok, which would make it very difficult for them to sustain the attack. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the standard of Russian submarine training is equal to such long distance patrols.
30. There is nothing the Russians can do on land or in the air directly to embarrass us in the Far East. The fact that we were at war with Russia might, however, cause Japan to pursue a more forward policy in the Far East, to the detriment of Allied interests. The extent to which Japanese action might cause us embarrassment would depend upon the attitude of the United States.
III. METHODS BY WHICH THE ALLIES COULD STRIKE AT RUSSIA.
31.
We now turn to consider the ways in which the Allies could bring pressure to bear upon Russia under the following headings:-
1
Northern Europe.
Near and Middle East.
Far East.
J
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