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Naval Action.

NORTHERN EUROPE.

32. Our existing dispositions for exercising contraband control against Germany in northern waters would enable us to interrupt Russian seaborne trade outside the Baltic, including the limited trade which passes through Russia's northern ports.

33. Petsamo, Murmansk and Archangel would all provide suitable targets for carrier-borne air attack and for offensive mining and submarine action. Similarly Narvik, if the Russians should reach that port, would be exposed to attack from the sea and might be harried incessantly. Naval raids designed to destroy shipping and port facilities might well prove practicable on any of the above harbours, although the consequences to Russia would not be serious. Land and Air Action.

34. Allied intervention through Scandinavia might provide us with air bases from which we could reach Russian territory. It would, however, be unsafe to assume that we could attack important objectives such as those at Leningrad, since we should be committed to intensive operations with Germany. For this reason we could not count on striking a direct blow at Russia in this area, but if the Soviet decided to extend her advance beyond Finland to the Norwegian coast at Narvik, Allied support in the Scandinavian countries would greatly increase the strain on Russia in her attempt to carry out the project. Intervention in this area would also hasten the defeat of Germany if we could occupy the orefields at Galivare.

Naval Operations.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST.

35. The attitude of Italy would greatly influence our ability to conduct naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea against Russian seaborne trade and naval forces.

36. In the first instance, we should exercise contraband control over Russian seaborne trade passing through the Egean. This would include the important inter-coastal traffic between the Black Sea and the Far East, and our control would be greatly facilitated by Turkish co-operation with the consequent closing of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

37. Later, assuming Turkish co-operation and that we had been able to concentrate the necessary naval and air forces, we could operate against Russian forces and sea communications in the Black Sea. Interruption of the Black Sea trade would adversely affect Russian industry and throw extra strain on the railways. The Allied naval forces would need to include heavy ships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and we might be hard put to it to spare these forces, and particularly the smaller ships, from other services. Before we could operate naval forces in the Black Sea the provision of a secure base would be essential, and this is under active consideration with the Turks.

38. The whole Black Sea is within range of Soviet shore-based air forces, and this fact would impose an initial restriction on our naval operations until the measure of this threat had been obtained by experience.

General Conditions governing Attack on Russian Oil Supplies in the Caucasus.

39. The Soviet dependence on the Caucasian oilfields has already been emphasised. Subject to the factors stressed below there are three possible methods of interrupting or destroying these supplies. Firstly, by air attack; secondly, by naval action in the Black Sea and, lastly, by Turkish land operations. from Eastern Anatolia.

40.

All three of the above methods are governed by the fact that we cannot reach any of the Russian vulnerable points in the Black Sea or Caucasus unless we obtain the co-operation of Turkey or Iran, or infringe their territorial rights. The question whether these countries can be induced to depart from their neutral position is a political one.

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