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then could only be employed if sufficient progress had been made in the provision of maintenance requirements. There would, moreover, be no anti-aircraft units available in the Middle East or India to accompany these forces, and the provision of aircraft would be a matter of considerable difficulty.
General.
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.
20. Once hostilities between the Allies and Russia had begun, it is unlikely that the Soviet Government would lose any time in taking action against India and Afghanistan. It would clearly be in the Russian and the German interest to create in India and on her frontiers the maximum diversion of Allied strength. Russia may therefore be expected to make the fullest use of the land and air forces that she can dispose in the Central Asian Military District. She would also make full use of agents to stir up revolutionary activity within India.
Soviet Land Threat.
21. With the forces normally located in this area Russia could rapidly occupy those provinces of Afghanistan which lie to the north of the Hindu Kush. Her object would be to bring about the fall of the Kabul Government and generally disturb the remainder of Afghanistan and the whole of the North-West Frontier of India. A land advance on India could be undertaken by Russia only as a long-term project, if at all, and it would, in any event, be beyond the capacity of the forces now stationed in the Central Asian military district.
Soviet Air Threat.
22. The small force of Soviet bombers at present located in the Central Asian Military District could reach objectives in any part of Afghanistan and certain important centres in the north-west of India, such as Peshawar. A few long-range bombers exist elsewhere in Russia, and could be moved into the district, thus bringing Indian centres of population as far as Lahore and Quetta within range of attack; but Russia would require some months in which to concentrate a formidable bomber force against India, and her ability to do so would depend upon the extent of her air force commitments in other areas and upon the effects of Allied counter-measures, particularly against the Caucasian oil supply.
23. Russian air attacks on Afghanistan would probably be directed against Kabul as a primary objective in order to drive out the Afghan Government and so lead to the disintegration of all forces of law and order. Air attacks on India might cause considerable damage in the crowded cities of the north-west. Their principal result, however, would be to create acute internal security problems for us, particularly in the frontier districts where serious tribal disorders might result.
British Support to Afghanistan.
24. If Russia were to take action on the lines described above, it is almost certain that the Afghan Government would appeal to us for assistance both on land and in the air.
25. It must be realised at once that the despatch of forces from India to Kabul via the Khyber route would be impossible in the event of widespread tribal unrest. Even if the tribes were at the time undisturbed it might prove a serious military commitment for which the forces at the disposal of the Govern- ment of India are not designed. Similarly it would be impossible to provide any fighter aircraft or anti-aircraft units. The Indian Government might. however, be able to assist the Afghans by despatching a small mobile force towards Ghazni via Kandahar. A force operating on this line could subsequently be extricated if, in the worst event, it was found that we were powerless to avert a state of chaos throughout Afghanistan. Our operations would then have to be confined to the control of the Indian frontier and to the maintenance of law and order in India.
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