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Russian submarines should succeed in entering the Mediterranean, they could develop a serious threat to our sea communications and we should have to despatch anti-submarine forces from home waters.

14. In the Balkans limited Russian operations might be aimed at gaining control of the Roumanian oil supplies, either in collaboration or in competition with the Germans. Against Turkey they might be designed to gain depth in front of the Batum defences, and in Iran their object might be to gain depth in front of the Baku defences and to facilitate air operations against the Anglo- Iranian oilfields, the Iraqi oilfields and other objectives in Iraq.

15. The spread of the war to the Balkans would, in our opinion, be to our disadvantage, but this is a situation which is more likely to be brought about by a conflict of German and Russian interests rather than by a Russian attempt to strike at the Allies, and is therefore outside the scope of this paper. With regard to the Caucasus, we do not think the Russian forces are in any state to undertake operations against the Turkish army in position. The question of Iran and Iraq is examined in more detail below.

Land Operations.

IRAN AND IRAQ.

16. The possibility of a Russian land offensive directed on the Anglo- Iranian oilfields is remote, both because of Turkey's position on the flank of any such advance, and because of the heavy strain that would be imposed on Russia's resources. Russia might, however, overrun the northern districts of Iran which lie between the Turkish border and the Caspian sea, at least as far as Tabriz. This invasion would no doubt be accompanied by attempts to stir up the Kurds on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier and so cause trouble in the Iraqi oilfields. We do not think it probable that the Russians could penetrate more deeply into Iran, in view of the paucity of communications which could in any event be subjected to Allied air attack. A Russian air bombardment of Teheran and other centres of population in Iran might, however, result in the disintegration of the central authority and throw Iran into a state of turmoil.

Air Operations.

17. Russia has a small number of long-range bombers which could reach the Anglo-Iranian oilfields and chief towns in Iraq from aerodromes in the Caucasus. Sporadic attacks on a light scale could be made, and these might inflict serious material damage at Abadan if this area were to remain devoid of air defences. The effect of bombing on the Iraqi population might well result in internal disorders which the Iraq Army would be incapable of controlling. In this event, our land communications connecting Palestine with the Persian Gulf would be seriously interrupted. It is possible that modern German bombers, or even complete German squadrons, might be operated in conjunction with Russian air forces and appreciably increase the efficacy of attacks, but this is not likely in the early stages of the war.

Allied Defence Measures.

18. On land a force of three brigades is the minimum necessary to provide for the internal security of the Anglo-Iranian oilfields and Basra, which might become the scenes of serious disorder resulting from Russian air action and tribal risings. This force could be made available, but one of the brigades would come from East Africa and would have to be replaced there by a brigade either from West Africa or elsewhere. To counter sporadic air attacks on Abadan by bombers based on Caucasian aerodromes, some fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft defences would be necessary to act as a deterrent. The necessary aircraft could only be found from those at present earmarked for the defence of Egypt or Turkey. No anti-aircraft units are available for this purpose in India or the Middle East.

19. If Iran were reduced to a state of chaos, there would be repercussions in Iraq, and we might require in Iraq and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields a total of three divisions with the requisite air support. These land forces could not be found from our resources in India and the Middle East until late in 1940, and

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