Page 174
Page 174
146
6.
Further examination of the offensive action we might
take against Russia has confirmed our earlier opinion that
the Caucasus is the one area in which Russia is really
vulnerable and that this area might well be dealt with by
air attack.
7.
The problem of air attack on the Russian oilfields
may be summed up as follows:
8.
(a) Air attack on the Caucasian oilfields must
involve flight over either Turkish or Iranian territory.
(b) Our aircraft now in the Middle East cannot
reach the Caucasus from bases in Iraq; nor are there any suitable aerodromes, within the necessary range, in Eastern Anatolia, where communications are in any case extremely poor.
(c) If, however, we had an advanced base at Tehran,
our aircraft could attack Baku. There is, therefore, much to be said from the air point of view for obtaining Iranian co-operation.
(a) Bomber squadrons in the Middle East are to be re-equipped with long-range aircraft, which will be able to attack the Russian oilfields from bases in Iraq. This re- equipment is not, however, likely to be completed until late this year and may be further retarded if operations in Scandinavia develop.
(e) Iraq is not yet at war. If we were to use
Iraqi air bases for an attack on the Baku area, it might cause internal trouble, in which case we should require some army forces to ensure at least the local security of our air bases in Iraq.
If, therefore, we had to operate against the Russian
oilfields in the near future, we should have to obtain the
active assistance of Iran since, in view of our limited
strength, we are unlikely to be able to send out long-range
pireraft from home.
L
3
Page 174
Page 174
Page 174