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Our present policy is to give preference to Turkish and

Finnish demands, which are the most urgent.

1.5

Our resources

are limited and we see no prospect of being able to supply Iran Curing 1940 with the 60 bomber and 20 fighter aircraft,

of modern type; suggested by the Iranian Minister,

Co-ordination of War Plans with Iran.

4.

We agree with the Foreign Office that two separate

issues are involved, i.e.,

(i)

the defence of our Middle East interests against possible Soviet ambitions, and

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50

(ii)

the possible use of the Middle East as a base

for attacks upon the Soviet Union.

In regard to (i) above, the main Russian threat to

our interests in Iraq and Iran would come from propaganda, which might lead to internal disturbances, and air attack. We not regard a Russian land advance through Iran as likely.

do

If war broke out with Russia, we should immediatoly

have to send to Basra a force adequate to ensure the security

of the port of Basra and of the A.1.0.C. oilfields area

against internal disturbance and air attack.

If no Russian

air attacks developed and internal conditions in the area

remained quiet, there might be no necessity to move forces into Iranian territory. It would, in fact, be desirable to

avoid such a course in order to preserve Iranian meutrality

until such time as we needed Iranian co-operation for

offensive operations against Russia.

On the other hand,

if Russian attacks took place or subversive activity was

prevalent, we should move a force into the oilfields area,

with or without Iranian consent, In either event we see

no reason to co-ordinate plans with the Iranian Government

in advance,

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