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(b) The first line strength of the German air
force is already in excess of what could be maintained, either by production of aircraft or of trained crews, in prolonged and intensive operations assuming that our fighter defences have not been successfully crippled in the initial stages. This condition would be accentuated by a further first line expansion, of which there are already some indications. This may indicate that German air policy is based on the conception of an air offensive of short duration, but intended to be on a decisive scale.
Intelligence.
26. In our examination of this appreciation our attention
has been drawn to the lack of satisfactory intelligence in
respect of the German industrial situation since the out-
break of war. Accurate information regarding the output of
the German aircraft industry, for instance, is lacking.
We think that a valuable indication of enemy intentions
might be obtained if we knew the kind of war material
being produced in Germany. We have particularly in mind
the output of offensive weapons of all kinās.
We understand that the Minister for Co-ordination of
Defence has already given some consideration to the matter,
but do not know what steps he proposes to take. We suggest therefore hat the intelligenes stall of the Minh Turonic however, that the following might be considered: - warfare might be signals to concentrate on the problem.
The appointment of a special committeé to examine the whole question (sucir as the Committee, under Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd, which Cxamined dorman eil resources.)
27.
(a)
(b) Alternatively, the intelligence staff or
Ministry of Economie Verfare might be
nstructed to concentrate on the problem.
There is one other source from which German
intentions might be gauged German propaganda. It is
known that German propaganda abroad differs appreciably
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