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5.
(e) On the conclusion of the actual operations,
the Government of India intend to transfer control of the Ahmadzai Salient to civil forces.
(f) Active preparations for these operations are
proceeding and the Government of India await authority to start.
Conclusions.
From the Imperial point of view, the fewer the military forces that have to be locked up for local reasons the better. The growth of a local operation into a major campaign would be a serious matter, in that it might affect the availability of forces in India for other purposes, and might even necessitate the despatch of re-inforcements to India.
6.
It is an undoubted fact that the situation in the
Bannu area is now bad. In the opinion of the Government of India it is intolerable and calls for immediate
military action.
No one can guarantee that military operations begun on a small scale will not grow to much larger dimensions and this applies especially to the North West Frontier of India.
On the other hand, if a deteriorating situation
is not dealt with promptly, the use of an even greater force may well be required to restore it at a later stage.
8.
The immediate point at issue, therefore, is quite clear. It is to decide which of these two dangers is the greater - that of a small commitment undertaken now
becoming a large one, or that of inaction now giving rise
to a still larger commitment later.
9.
We understand from the Telegrams which have passed
Annexes 1 and 2.
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