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ANNEX.
Column 1.
French Views (as expounded at the Meeting on January 31, 1940).
1. The immediate object is to save Finland.
2. If it is to be effective assis- tance to Finland will probably involve hostilities with Russia.
3. The issue raised by the above is a political one, but. from the military point of view, the consequences can be accepted.
4. Norwegian and Swedish opinion is not yet ripe for direct intervention through their countries. Allied intervention in Finland would. however, stiffen and encourage them, and night ultimately secure their co-opera- tion.
5. The only entry which is immediately available into Fin- land is Petsamo.
6. It is agreed that our ulti- mate objective should be the occupation of Gallivare, but there is no need to take a decision on this point for the moment. Plans and preparations must, however, be completed in every detail to enable us to take advantage of any opportun- ity that may arise.
7. The Petsamo operation is not one which could be under- taken light-heartedly. All its implications would require the most careful examination, and
Columm 2.
British Comments On French
Views in Column 1.
1. We agree, subject to the proviso that any action we take to help Finland is strictly related to our main object-the defeat of Germany.
2. We agree.
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8. We take very serious view of the implications of hostilities with Russia. Apart from the dispersal of our Naval forces that would be involved, there would be serious reper- cussions in India and Tran. These countries would demand fighter aircraft and A.A. artillery, which could be supplied only at the expense of the Western front or of England. In general, we would be prepared to recom- mend the risk of hostilities with Russia for the sake of a great prize, such as Gallivare; but not otherwise.
4. The British Foreign Office predict precisely the opposite effect. They think the more successful our action in aid of the Finns, the more will Norway and Sweden retire into their shell of neutrality. Even if this estimate is incorrect, the fact remains that, in order to fore- stall the Germans at Gallivare, we ought to land at Narvik by the end of March. Conse- quently, there would be no time for the Petsamo venture to have influenced Scandinavian opinion in our favour.
5. We agree.
6. We agree.
But if we are to forestall the Germans we must occupy Gallivare before the Gulf of Bothnia is free of ice. (The earliest date on which this has occurred is on the 26th April.)
7. We agree with the broad conception of the operations, and particularly with the opinion that they cannot be undertaken light-heartedly. We
Column 3.
French observations on British Comments in Column 2 (as expounded at Meeting on February 1, 1940).
1. We wholly agree that the ultimate aim is the defeat of Germany. Everything must be considered from that angle.
2. No comment,
There
3. We entirely agree. is no war or operation of war unattended by risk. We have identical views that our essential interest is to obtain possession of the mines at Gallivare.
4. The French High Com- mand is not in a position to appreciate what attitude would be adopted by Norway and Sweden. We agree that, if the situation allows of the seizure of Gallivare before the ice melts in the Gulf of Bothnia, there is every advantage in doing so.
5. No comment.
6. We agree.
7. No comment.
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