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Column 2.

Column 1.

French Views (as expounded at the Meeting on January 31, 1940).

the closest co-ordination with the Finns would be essential.

Subject to the above, the broad conception is as follows:-

(a) Naval operations to interrupt the communica- tions between Murmansk and Petsamo, so starving the Russian forces in the latter

area.

(b) An advance by the Finns from the southward against the debilitated Russians at Petsumo.

(c) Landing operations at or near Petsamo by a force of about three Brigades, one of Chasseurs Alpins, two batta- lions of the Foreign Legion (possibly), four battalions of Poles and one to two British Brigades.

8. The object of the operations would be to rid Northern Finland of Russian Forces.

9. Naval operations are depen- dent on the establishment of a base in Norwegian territorial waters possibly in some lonely fjord.

10. The establishment of such a base can be justified as action taken in support of the League of Nations Resolution to help Finland.

British Comments

on

French Views in Column 1.

do not wish to over-emphasise the operational and adminis- trative difficulties, but following points merit atten-

tion:-

the

(a) The quay facilities, if they

still exist, are primitive. (b) Ice sometimes persists in the Petsamo inlet until late April. (c) There

are considerable Russian Air forces at Murmansk. Even though they may not be very efficient, opposition to them will be limited to seaborne fighter aircraft and A.A. Guns in the vicinity of the port.

(d) Complete lack of local

transport.

(e) The only really mobile troops in the Allied contin- gent are the Chasseurs Alpins.

8. The operation is a gamble, but

we agree that it is not impossible to eject Russian forces from Northern Finland provided that:-

(a) There is ર first-class Commander and first-class troops. (b) The

effectively. (c) It is possible to starve the Russians out of Murmansk by severing their communi- cations to the southwards, e.g., at Kandalaksha, and to establish a base at Mur- mansk which will support much larger forces than can be maintained from Petsamo. (d) The operations are com- pleted by May. After May the situation becomes un-

Finns co-operate

predictable. (See para- graph 13 (b).)

9. We agree.

10. We doubt whether this will carry much weight with the Norwegians and Swedes, or even with the British Dominions. If, however, we are going to invoke Article XVI of the Covenant of the League, it would be prefera- ble, and no less logical, to employ these arguments to obtain an entry into Scandinavia

Column 3.

French observations on British Comments in Column 2 (as

expounded at

Meeting on

February 1, 1940).

8. No comment, but we draw attention to what we have said, namely, that Marshal Manner- heim considers that he can hold out only by reducing the width of his active front through clearing up his front in Lapland (Northern Finland). There is no doubt that Finnish troops are to take part in these operations. It is clearly necessary that operations must be completed before seasonal conditions enable the Russians to increase their efforts.

9. No comment.

10. There can

be no doubt that the only reason why we are limited to the Petsamo operation is because we cannot see our way to assisting Finland over the Narvik-Lulea line. If we could use the latter then the Petsamo plan could be reduced to naval operations combined possibly with a small landing.

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