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3.
The War Office cannot carry out the close co-ordination which is necessary during the present planning stage and which will be vital when battle is joined and formations have to be moved from one part to another of this extensive front. Communications do not permit the War Office to retain sufficiently close touch with the administrative situation: nor is the War Office designed to undertake functions which are properly those of a Commander-in-Chief in the field. On purely military grounds there is an overwhelming case for placing the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East in control of land operations throughout the whole Middle East theatre, in the same way that the Air Officer Comunanding-in-Chief, Middle East is in control of all air operations.
4.
The main difficulty in making the transfer lies in the political opposition which is likely to be raised in India, and the effect of this upon India's war effort. It may be possible to lessen this opposition by allotting India an increased say in Middle East Councils and, if transfer takes place, I certainly think this should be done.
One thing is sure the longer we postpone transfer, the more difficult politically will it be to effect.
5.
Date of Transfer.
The foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion that if the political disadvantage can be overcome or accepted, transfer should take place now, so that the defence of the whole Northern Front can now be planned and organised as one.
On the other hand, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East has his attention now focussed on his Western flank and when in London recently he stated that he was not at present willing to accept the additional responsibility for Iraq and Persia.
In my view, however, the danger of divided control is now so great that transfer should take place as soon as Commander-in- Chief, Middle East's pre-occupation with CRUSADER permits.
6.
To minimise for India the difficulty of accepting the surrender of control to Middle East, and to ensure that Commander- in-Chief, India, has an adequate opportunity of stating his views to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East, I suggest that:-
(a) Government of India should have a political
representative with the Minister of State in Cairo; this representative should be a member of the Middle East Defence Council.
(b) Commander-in-Chief, India should be represented
at General Headquarters, Cairo by an officer of general rank.
(c) Commander-in-Chief, India should be further
represented by a member on the Joint Planning Staff in Cairo.
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