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به

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KÈY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

SECRET.

人

This document was considered at 44 389 Meeting.

C. O. S. (41) 681.

13TH NOVEMBER, 1941.

WAR CABINET.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

Mavad 8. COPY NO.

CONTROL OF LAND FORCES IN IRAQ AND PERSIA.

Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

On the 25th August, 1941, I submitted a report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee setting out the case for and against the transfer of control of land forces in Iraq to Middle East. The Chiefs of Staff approved this report on the 3rd September, 1941 and agreed that:-

(a) No change should be made at present in the

arrangements for the cominand of the Army in Iraq.

(b) That it should be accepted as a principle that an immediate threat of an enemy advance into Northern Iraq and Syria would call for unified command of our land forces in those areas under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

(c) That the necessary arrangements should be made to

ensure that the change of command could be effected when required smoothly and quickly.

No clearer definition of the time to implement the unification of control was then necessary than when "an immediate threat of an enemy advance" should arise. Today the threat is appreciably nearer, if not imminent. The Germans may reach Transcaucasia in February and active operations in Northern Iraq and Persia are likely in the Spring. The question now arises as to how long we can wait before unifying command in the Middle East and Iraq.

2.

At present Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East and India are planning separately, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East for operations in Anatolia and Syria, and Commander-in-Chief, India for operations in Northern Iraq and Persia, although a measure of co-ordination is achieved by occasional visits of Commanders and Staff Officers. Moreover, recent telegrams show that each Commander-in-Chief is tending more and more to consider his own problem and not the situation as a whole.

X

C. O. S. (41) 516, subsequently C. O. S. (41) 521. C. O. S. (41) 310th Meeting, Item 5.

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