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ANNEX II.
Copy of Telegram dated 18th January, 1941, from Commander-in-Chief Far East in the Air Ministry.
GHQFE. 222 18/1.
I.
W
-45A
:
214
Reference your X.444/14/1.
Whilst of course
fully prepared to accept your decision I feel that in my GHOFE.135 of 6/1 I may not have adequately represented my views.
In order to ensure that you fully appreciate the reasons that have led to the opinion that I have formed I will elaborate the last sentence of para.2 and also para.3 of my signal referred to above.
2.
One of the main problems of the defence of Hong Kong and probably the most difficult arises from the large numbers of Chinese. These have doubled both in island and in Kowloon during last three years. Governor fully realises desirability of reducing these numbers now but chances of effecting this have decreased owing to famine in Kuanyung.
3.
Military
The total police force in the colony at present time is 2100 an increase of 1500 has been sanctioned but these can
Even 3600 only be trained and made efficient gradually. is a small number to control some two million Chinese. aid to civil power may well become necessary e.g. to prevent a rush from the mainland on to the island by swarms of refugees using the large number of sanpans and junks in the area, or again to quell panic and to control dispersal from Victoria in the event of air bombing, it will be months yet before air raid shelters are available for even half the present population. With only 4 battalions the withdrawal of any troops to assist the police is a danger to military defence. End of part one. Part two and three to follow.
GHQFE 222. 18/1.
II
Part 2 begins para.4.
At present there are various civil defence measures which it is difficult to take before the precautionary period.
For instance extreme
dispersal of foodstuffs and of petrol is necessary to minimise losses from bombing and bombardment. early deterioration and loss will occur.
If done too This may have to
be faced but other measures such as removal or destruction · of all junks and ather vessels is impracticable as a peace time measure. If we could rely definitely on say 7 days warning the problem would be simpler to solve but so far as I can see the warning may be very short so we have to depend upon the resistance put up by the military forces on the mainland.
X
Annex II to C.0.S.(41)28. C.0.S.(41)18.
-4-
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