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5.

215

3 Battalions must be retained on the Island leaving at present 1 Battalion available for the defence of the mainland. This Battalion has its allotted sector in the defence of the Island to occupy after withdrawl from the mainland and therefore must not risk becoming deeply involved on the mainland thereby sustaining heavy casualties. From personal reconnaissance on the spot and full discussion with the Service heads concerned, I came to the conclusion that one Battalion on the mainland could only offer a slight resistance and that its evacuation to the Island might have to take place in 48 hours, but that if the 1 Battalion could be multiplied by 3 the period of resistance would in all probability be multiplied by 6. In other words 3 extra Battalions would ensure time to carry out the various measures that are such an important feature of the defence of Hong Kong but which are impracticable to carry out before a precautionary period should there be one. End of Part 2. Part 3 to fellow,

GHQFE 222 18/1.

III

Part 3 begins. Para.6. With only four Battalions for the defence of the island the whole force is practically in the front line all the time and is widely dispersed in pill boxes many in Malaria areas. The sick rate therefore is likely to increase owing to fatigue and lack of opportunity to recuperate. Two extra Battalions will enable proper reliefs

In addition a to be carried cut and thus reduce wastage. reserve will be available in the hands of the G.0.C. either for assistance to the civil power, for a counter attack or for carrying out small forties across the (FTTER) the moral effect of which on both sides is difficult to exaggerate.

7.

I will not venture to criticise the opinion expressed in Para.2 of your gnal under reference that an increase of the Garrison from 4 to 6 Battalions would be unlikely materially to influence the Japanese, I would only remark that the recent despatch of 1 Company to Sarawak gave rise to

a report that Borneo was being garrisoned by several thousand soldiers.

8.

I will not repeat the argument given in Para.5 of my signal 135 of 6/1 but will merely suggest that the 'present circumstances' referred to in your signal X.444 are perhaps different now from what they were in November, for instance as you know Australian Brigade is due to arrive in Malaya next month and I hope soon to arrange a 3 party conference of Australians, Dutch and ourselves to work out definite plans

f operation, I am sending you a separate signal on this subject.

us out here it seems no longer a question of reducing our losses in Hong Kong but of ensuring the security of places that will be of great value in taking offensive action at a later stage of the war. As indicated in Para.6 of my signal of 6/1 I fully realise that any extra Battalions can only be sent to Hong Kong after requirements of Malaya have been notified. End of Part three. Message ends.

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