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[F.O.E.S,(40)1.(REVISE

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ENCLOSURE.

VAR CABINET.

FUTURE OPERATIONS (ENEMY) PLANNING SECTION.

APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION

+

The Chiefs of Staff at their meeting held on the 6th December, 1940, instructed the F.0.(E), Section:-

Jud

"To prepare a brief strategical appreciation from

the enemy's point of view".

The following are our conclusions and recommendations. The considerations which have guided us are set forth in the attached Annex.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Germany has the initiative.

1.

England has at present

On no military means of dealing a mortal blow at Germany. the other hand, Germany has every prospect of being able to strike down England if e make the attempt before our own strength is weakened by economic pressure.

(b) Blockade and air attack are our principal weapons. We must intensify the blockade and secure better co-ordination between sea and air effort.

(c) It is hoped that England will be so weakened as to The difficulty enable us to accelerate victory by invasion. of the task is recognised. The R.A.F. must first be defeated and the navy neutralised or dispersed. But in any event the threat of invasion must be maintained so as to reinforce the blockade by diverting the British Navy from the task of protecting commerce,

2.

(a) We cannot in principle recommend diverting forces from the main theatre, But we may be compelled to do so:-

(i) to increase the pressure of the blockade.

(ii)as a security measure.

(b) To increase the pressure of the blockade, we must be ready at the first favourable moment to occupy Spain and

We might Fortugal and even some of their Atlantic islands. follow this by the occupation of the Tangier, Ceuta, Tetuan regions: Pressure on Spain must be maintained in the hope of inducing Franco to modify his present senseless attitude.

(c) As security measures we must be ready to:-

(i) invade Greece through the Balkans, as soon as the situation demands. Preparations for this operation must be accelerated.

(ii)occupy part or the whole of Italy to forestall

an Italian collapse;

(iii)give the minium assistance to Italy to

prevent the collapse of the Regime.

+C.0.S.(40)417th Meeting.

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