Page 113
Page 113
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOvernment
Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1941.
Page 113
19
100
SECRET.
This document was considered at .o.(41) 4 Meeting.
Copy No.
29
C.O.S. (41) 19. January 7, 1941.
(trial of J.? (41) 15)
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET.
Chiefs of Staff Committee.
AIR BOMBARDMENT POLICY.
REPORT.
WE desire to lay before the War Cabinet certain considerations which in our opinion call for a careful review of our air bombardment policy against Germany.
2. The first of these considerations arises out of the conclusions of the 5th Report by the Lloyd Committee, which afford strong arguments for concen- trating our air offensive on oil objectives, especially during the next six months.
3.
The second of these is that a body of opinion favours concentration on other main alternatives, such as the enemy morale or navy.
4. Lastly, experience has emphasised that with a bomber force greatly inferior in strength to that of the enemy and with our objectives much more distant than those of the German bomber force, it is imperative that we should exert the greatest possible economy of force in the framing of our bomber policy. An analysis of our bomber effort in recent months has shown that its effectiveness has been seriously diminished by the diversity of the types of objectives which have been allotted to it.
For these reasons we are strongly in favour of selecting one primary aim for our limited bomber effort and of undertaking no material diversion from this aim. 5. We set out below a summary of the principal factors involved and of the arguments for and against each main group of targets.
6. The main alternative groups of targets are :--
(a) the German air force.
(b) anti-invasion targets.
transportation.
(d) industries.
morale.
(f) naval objectives. (g) oil.
These are examined below.
The German Air Force.
7. The reduction of the air threat to our industrial effort, particularly our aircraft industry, and to our ports and trade would undoubtedly be a considerable military asset and would assist us to develop our offensive powers.
[22099]
B
Page 113
Page 113