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With this in mind an exhaustive examination has been pursued continuously to determine the Key Points in the German air force and aircraft industry. It has been found that, owing to the dispersion which the enemy has achieved throughout his air force and aircraft industry, attacks on aerodromes and other objectives are unprofitable. The only hopeful line of attack was against the aluminium factories. The acquisition by Germany of the French aluminium resources has, however, now rendered this also a much less profitable target. On a longer term view, the only means of breaking the power of the German air force and aircraft industry is by the attack on oil, an objective further discussed below.

8. The conclusion, therefore, is that we cannot, with our present strength, effect any appreciable reduction in the scale of air attack on this country in the next six months by concentrating our homber effort on the German air force or the German aircraft industry.

Anti-invasion Targets.

Invasion is a vital threat, which we must always be prepared to counter; but as the attack of the invasion ports is a purely defensive operation, it would not be justified until invasion is imminent. Moreover, no suitable objective is offered to our bombers until the enemy forces and shipping are concentrated for the attack.

Transportation.

10. The cumulative effect of dislocating the German transportation system is one of the most important contributions that our bombing can make to Germany's economic disruption. This will be increased as the shortage of deficiency commodities increases and their distribution in the quantity required over the extensive areas now under Germany's control becomes more difficult.

11. The most profitable targets for attack are the focal points on the railways and certain points in the canal system. To achieve good effect by material damage experience has shown that a heavy sustained effort is required. It is impossible to achieve effective and lasting dislocation by this means at the relatively large number of focal points with the present strength of our bomber force. Furthermore, the development of coastwise shipping is to some extent relieving the transportation system of Northern Europe.

12. Although this type of target might at a later stage when greater strength is available prove a profitable objective, it does not at present justify its selection as the primary aim for the bomber force. Useful dislocation can, however, be achieved by harassing action over railway marshalling yards which can be done by aircraft failing to find their primary targets.

War Industries.

13. The Air Staff's analysis shows that there are certain Key Points in the supply of electricity and gas to the main industrial areas, which, if destroyed. would practically bring the main German war industry to a standstill.

14. The objection to the attack of Power is that the targets are small and comparatively numerous, and do not generally lie in the centre of largely populated areas where a conflagration might destroy them. While they might prove a practical objective for day attack, they are difficult to locate and hit by high-level bombing at night.

Since, therefore, night bombing is the only form of attack which our striking force can carry out economically at the present time, power does not appear suitable for selection as a primary aim.

Morale.

15. The evidence at our disposal goes to show that the morale of the average German civilian will weaken quicker than that of a population such as our own as a consequence of direct attack. The Germans have been under-nourished and subjected to a permanent strain equivalent to that of war conditions during almost the whole period of Hitler's régime, and for this reason also will be liable to crack before a nation of greater stamina.

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