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35. In regard to 33(b) above, invasion of Greece; Bulgaria might by promise and threat, by playing upon her opportunist policy, be drawn into the Axis or, at least, be compelled to facilitate the transit of German troops. Yugoslavia might resist. Turkey might take action against Bulgaria. There would be a great danger of the Balkans being thrown into a turmoil which would hamper the supply of Roumanian oil and other commodities urgently required by Germany. The economic disadvantages of this course are so great that it is only likely to be adopted -
f
(1)
(ii)
As a security measure to remove the British air threat to Roumanian oil supply;
After Hitler has satisfied himself that a direct blow against England will not win the war at this stage and that he must first attack us in the Mediterranean. An offensive against Greece may well be preceded by a diplomatic effort to promote peace between Italy and Greece.
36.
In regard to 33(c) above, an advance towards Syria; this is a long term policy. At present the same objections obtain as in the case of invasion of Greece from the north. In addition the attitude of Russia to a German occupation of the Straits is doubtful and the operation would involve the diversion of serious air forces from the main front against England. Under present conditions it is improbable..
37. France.
In regard to 33(d) above, the occupations of Unoccupied The objects would be the occupation of French harbours the seizure and use of the French Fleet, free commurication to Italy on the one hand and into Spain by the Barcelona route on the other, but there is a risk of the French Government and fleet moving to North Africa, if Germany presses France too hard.
So long as this condition exists the disadvantages to Germany of occupying the whole of France outweigh any advantage.
38. In regard to 33(e) above, the occupation of Italy. This problem will arise only in the event of immediate danger of Italy collapsing entirely. That eventuality is not yet imminent. Should it occur an occupation of the industrial north, on the Roumanian model, is very probable. Whether this occupation would be extended depends upon circumstances, such as the position and condition of the Italian fleet, which cannot at present be foreseen.
IV. COURSES OPEN TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE.
39.
England has the initiative only in Africa and in minor operations elsewhere. While her fleet is dispersed and until her rearmament is much further advanced she is unable to initiate major operations and must, in the main, stand on the defensive at home. The courses which are open to her are
(a)
To continue her operations against Italy in Libya. This is certain up to a point which depends upon the degree of resistance which Italy can put up. At a later stage seaborne attacks against Italian territory are possible. For the moment troops are not available for anything more than raids.
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