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An even greater embarrassment would be caused to
us if the German heavy ships were to be divided between northern and Biscay bases, since, in this case, we should be unable to maintain against both German forces our present margin of strength as well as to maintain even our present inferiority in the Mediterranean.
4.
An alternative strategy for the enemy would be to send his main fleet to reinforce the Mediterranean. The resultant combined enemy fleet could bring superior force against our Eastern Mediterranean Fleet before reinforcements could arrive, and might thus obtain free use of sea communications for an attack on the Near East.
5.
These are grave possibilities and their prevention by purely naval measures would be difficult. We are unable to reach the enemy ships in their harbours with naval weapons. The enemy, with his higher fleet speed, can refuse action until he has concentrated a superior force.
We are prevented by lack of a base in South-West Ireland from meeting effectively an emcy move to Biscay ports.
6.
Clearly the simplest solution of our difficulties is to destroy or damage the German heavy ships now in their bases by air action and so immobilise them. This would remove for a time at least the possibilities outlined in paragraphs 2,3 and 4 and would free our forces for more offensive action as indicated in paragraph 1.
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The reluctance of the Air Staff to divert their bomber offensive from industrial to naval targets is fully appreciated and is sound in principle. It must be pointed out, however, that, in practice the ultimate success of the bomber offensive on industrial targets is complementary to the success of the blockade. The continued existence of the German Fleet and its potential ability to operate from Biscay ports, or to reinforce the Mediterranean, threaten to break the blockade, and at all times cause a reduction in the naval forces which could be made available to stiffen the blockade. Intensive bombing of the German fleet is not, therefore, so great a diversion from the bombers' ultimate objective as might at first thought appear.
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It is therefore proposed that the full weight of our bombers should be put on to the German heavy ships at the earliest opportunity until sure proof of success is obtained.
Admiralty,
11TH OCTOBER, 1940.
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