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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to

ensure the secrecy of this document.

SECRET.

C.0. S. (40) 824.

11TH OCTOBER, 1940.

WAR CABINET.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

COPY NO.

쓰오

THE NECESSITY FOR BOMBING THE GERMAN FLEET.

Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Staff.

The continued presence of the German heavy ships in their bases in the north is having the following effects on our naval dispositions:·

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(a) The necessity for maintaining the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow at its present strength prevents us from reinforcing our capital ships in the Mediterranean Fleet, now inferior numerically to the Italians. It is in the Mediterranean that the Chiefs of Staff recent paper forecasts our initial offensive.

(b) The number of capital ships in the Home Fleet

necessarily ties up a corresponding number of cruisers and destroyers which are urgently required for the following duties:-

(i) To reinforce the A/S forces in the North

Western Approaches.

(ii) To reinforce the Mediterranean in order

that light forces may be based at Malta to operate on the lines of communication to Libya.

(iii) To strengthen the forces engaged on

blockade duties in all areas.

(iv) For the protection of troop convoys and

the hunting down of surface raiders outside home waters.

The enemy has recently moved destroyers to the French Atlantic ports and it would be possible for him to

Without move his main fleet also to the Bay of Biscay.

a base in Southern Ireland the problem of dealing with heavy German forces, including an aircraft carrier, operating from, say, the Gironde, would be an exceedingly difficult one. Besides being in a position to attack our trade and convoy routes, an enemy force so based could make the estern Patrol untenable.

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