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the increased strength of this country render invasion hazardous. Failure of an attempt would, in our opinion, prove disastrous to Germany.
5.
As regards (b), an intensified blockade by sea, and air attacks on our shipping and territory would produce immediate dividends and can be expected to continue in the hope of stopping our trade and defeating this country.
6.
As regards (c), attack on Egypt from Libya and possibly through the Sudan with the object of gaining control of the Suez Canal and the Eastern Mediterranean and relieving Abyssinia will be continued, and will be undertaken by Italy with the support of German forces. This course must be immensely attractive to the Axis in view of our weakness in the Middle East. Control of the Eastern Mediterranean would not, in itself, solve the Axis oil and general supply problems, but it would certainly reduce the risk of their becoming acute at a relatively early date in 1941, and before the plans now being made for improved communications with Roumania are completed. The time factor here is of importance to the Axis in view of the approaching winter when the efficiency of the present land communications for supplies, particularly oil, will be greatly reduced. The opening of the Eastern Mediterranean to sea-borne traffic is therefore a matter of real urgency for Germany. Until this has been achieved, sufficient quantities of oil and non-European produce could not be obtained to make the Axis' position secure.
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As regards (a) we may expect that political and military domination of Roumania will soon be completed. This is likely to be followed by similar domination of Bulgaria. The Axis Powers would then be in a position to exert pressure on Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Greece might be occupied to forestall any possibility of the Greek harbours (in particular those of Crete) being used by the British Fleet. These steps, in conjunction with a successful attack against Egypt, would secure Axis domination of the Eastern Mediterranean and the free passage for trade in that area.
8.
As a further step it might be hoped to persuade an isolated Turkey to permit passage to German troops through Thrace and Asia Minor to the Middle East. Unless the attitude of Russia stiffens, it is not likely that there will be any effective resistance to these Axis plans.
9.
An immediate intensification of Axis propaganda and subversive activity throughout the Middle East is to be expected in order to facilitate the above action.
10. As regards (e), control of Gibraltar and North and North-west Africa will always remain an important aim of Axis strategy. The balance of the evidence does not suggest that Spain will at present willingly enter the war on the Axis side. At some stage, an Axis demand to be allowed to move as through Spain must be anticipated. In that event it is not thought that the Spaniards will acquiesce in an Axis attack on Gibraltar in which they do not participate, will either endeavour to prevent the entry of German troops, or will join in the attack themselves and thus enter the war. Indications of any Spanish decision in face of such a demand should be apparent before-hand.
They
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