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5.
For the above purposes Air Officer Commanding
You will requires fullest co-operation from the Army.
however observe that the General Officer Commanding who still maintains statements and conclusions expressed on the 13th April in appreciation to the War Office, is not prepared to devote to air co-operation and aerodrome protection on the mainland more than one regular battalion plus volunteers as previously described. Note also that of regular ground forces only one battalion is allocated to the protection of Alor Star and resistance to enemy forces advancing from South Thailand. Air Officer Commanding requires use of Kota Bahru from which to intercept a proach and deliver attack on Japanese forces from the castward, but the General Officer Commanding states that he is unable to give protection (other than volunteers) unless on scale of one brigade (not available), though he only proposes one regular battalion for vital air link with Alor Star and frontier in that area. General Officer Commanding is relying upon Royal Air Force (plus one regular battalion and two volunteer battalions) to withstand advance of large scale attack from Thailand via Alor Star. In these circumstances Air Officer Commanding requires use of Kota Bahru (proposal to destroy which the General Officer Commanding has now withdrawn) and of Alor Star. Air Officer Commanding has positive doubts if extent of army assistance northward of Malaya is adequate to the circumstances envisaged by the General Officer Commanding.
6. Air Officer Commanding suggests mining waters to south of Singapore and passages through nearby Dutch Island to prevent entrance to Malacca Straits other than by lengthy route west and north of Sumatra and so save immediate necessity to retain regular or other forces on the west coast.
7.
Air Officer Commanding intends to fulfil general role assigned to the 2.A.F. with or without adequate co-operations of regular ground forces, but emphasises disadvantages of the absence of effective protection against even small scale attacks.
8.
General
Following the General Officer Commanding's statement that small scale attacks on east coast may now take place without warning. Air Officer Commanding has requested Kota Bahru and Kuanton may forthwith be guarded. Officer Commanding considers that he cannot supply guard of regular troops or even volunteers until mobilised. Air Officer Commanding requests me to add that he has declined General Officer Commanding's proposal to discuss whether it is worth while defending Singapore or Malaya.
General Officer Commanding says:-
General Officer Cor manding basing his scheme on the possibility of the arrival of the fleet as being only mili ary reason for retention of Singapore considers retention of Singapore is primary and overriding consideration even if air attack destroys repair facilities of the base. He considers security of Singapore against direct attack from the sea or from landing within striking distance does not permit any reduction of initial deployment of already inadequate garrison of fortress or of small mobile force available for operation in co-operation with
In forming the Air Force on approaches from land side. this conclusion he does not consider Air Forces available
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