CAB80-13 — Page 307

Page 307

Page 307

284

after a maximum period of two months.

Further that Malaya cannot be held if Singapore Island should fall, while if enemy established themselves in the north or central Malaya Singapore Island would not survive more than two months lack of food supplies. General Officer Commanding considers that the fate of Singapore and Malaya mainland was interdependent after two months. Following is General Officer Commanding's proposed initial distribution of ground forces:-

2.

(1) Regular troops (a) five battalions of regular infantry. Coast defence and A. A. troops. Three battalions force (sic) Emu and artillery Johore military force. R. E.'s (exclusive of Signals R. A. S. C. and other administrative troops), totalling 319 officers, 11,260 men in Singapore fortress area and south Johore (b) at Alor Star one battalion 760 all ranks (at present located Penang).

(2) Volunteers (largely non-Europeans).

Fit for

internal security duties and aerodrome guard – 269 officers and 5,488 men, at various points of the mainland including Alor Star and Singapore.

General Officer Commanding expresses himself unable to spare regular troops to oppose enemy landings or delay enemy advance anywhere outside Singapore Island, Johore and Penang except on approach to Singapore and at Alor Star.

3.

You will observe that, so far as ground defences are concerned, Singapore Island, to which the General Officer Commanding gives approximate endurance of two months, might fall as a result of landing on the mainland only without main body of regular troops ever becoming engaged.

4.

Air Officer Commanding Far East does not accept the General Officer Commanding's estimates of endurance except as affected by shortage of food supplies, He considers that estimates of time for which Singapore and/or Malaya can hold out are largely dependent on air action and the only reinforcements we can now count upon, viz air forces arriving by air reinforcement route or from Australia. He considers of the utmost importance that every facility should be available for use of air forces against enemy (a) during approach; (b) during landing; (c) subsequently. In view of the above the Air Officer Commanding considers that Alor Star must be held in force and that in addition necessary aerodromes for use of reinforcing air squadrons must be retained and guarded by ground forces at least against small scale attack. He points out that aerodrome s facilities on Singapore Island are insufficient to accommodate the necessary number of squadrons even if such a concentration corresponded to air requirements, which it does not.

-2--

Page 307

Page 307

Page 307