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be able to complete this stage of the operation under cover of darkness. During daylight hours such an expedition would be so vulnerable to Naval attack that it is considered most improbable that any voyage which
This included a period of daylight would be attempted. limits the probable landing places to beaches east of Beachy Head,
6.
Protection from the air could be afforded to the expedition against both air and sea attack as follows (the figures are for a sea crossing of 100 miles in length, i.e. as far West as Havre Chichester):-
по
-
Air attack.
(a) by the use of 500 heavy fighters (Me.110) available for the purpose which could (subject to casualties) maintain a
continuous standing patrol of approximately 110 fighters throughout the hours of daylight:
(b) by sorties of light fighters (Me. 109)
which could make up to 1500 sorties a day over any part of the English coast concerned, actual time over coast of each sortie being about 20 minutes. The number of fighters available would depend upon the number required for protection of German bases against which simultaneous
retaliatory action was being taken by our own bombers,
Sea attack.
(c) by that part of the German bomber air force
which was not employed on the bombing of land objectives in England.
From the point of view of air support any expedition of the type envisaged in para. 4 is likely to land east of Chichester Harbour inclusive.
8. The possibility of an expedition against any part of the coast from Hythe to Beachy Head by small craft, protected by small bonto and by aircraft, cannot therefore, be ruled out. Warning of the assembly on any substantial scale of such an expedition should be received, but the length of notice might be too short to enable an orderly evacuation bo tako place.
до
When the Germans occupy ports west of Havre (including Cherbourg, which is 80 miles from the English coast) an expedition in craft of large tonnage against ports as far west as Lyme Regis might be attempted, but the assembly of transports would gain be a hazardous operation, and Air and Naval reconnaissance should give sufficient warning to enable the expedition to be destroyed at sea by Naval Forces. In addition, it would not be possible for the enemy to provide as much air support as he could for the shorter voyage further East.
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