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5.
We should be in a good position to control the economic resources of the Allied Overseas Empires, and we could exercise Naval control of the wider ceans and focal points leading to the blockaded areas. This pressure would not,
To achieve of itself, bring about the defeat of our enemies. this, full Pan-American economic co-operation is essential so that raw materials of the worlã may be controlled at source.
In effect, our ability to defeat Germany would ultimately depend on a complete blockade of Europe, which must include the cutting off of supplies via Russia. Any relief to populations in territory occupied by the enemy would only serve to prolong the struggle.
6.
Without the full economic and financial co-operation of the whole of the American Continent, the task might in the ovent prove too great for the British Empire single-handed. Nevertheless, even if the hope of victory in these circumstances appeared remote, we should continue to fight as long as it was humanly possible to do so,
77. It has been suggested that, in the event of the United Kingdom being overrun by the enemy, the struggle could be continued by the British Fleet from the American Continent. In resisting invasion, however, the whole of our naval resources in home waters would be thrown into the defence and a successful invasion would automatically imply the loss of a large proportion of our fleet. The remaining forces, operating from America, would be faced with considerable problems of maintenance, supply and manning, and the combined German and Italian fleets, possibly strengthened by captured units of the French navy, might extend their activities well beyond the confines of Europe. Without our air weapon and with our ability to exert economic pressure through sea-power considerably reduced, our chances of victory would be virtually at an end, even with the ful military and economic assistance of the American Continent.
Far East.
8
The collapse of France would provide Japan with the temptation to take action against French, British or Dutch interests in the Far Easte We see no hope of being able to despatch a fleet to Singapore. It will therefore be vital that the United States of America should publicly declare her intention to regard any alteration of the status quo in the Far East as a casus belli.
West Indies and South America.
9.
We regard the maintenance of the status quo in the West Indies as of military importance, but we believe this to be assured by a recent resolution of the United States Congress re-affirming the Munroe doctrine in which it was stated that the United States could not tolerate the transfer of the colonial possessions in America of a European power to any non-American power.
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