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which I then used for adopting a plan of defence which will absolutely prevent his entering Fort Phillip. The only other mode of attack he could think of would be by landing a force in Western Port; and the fact that the exclusion of the enemy from Port Phillip leaves the shores of that great estuary in possession of the defenders, and gives them the power of acting on the flank of the enemy throughout the line of advance from Western Port, renders the attempt exceedingly improbable. At the same time, as I before stated, I recognize the necessity for the efficient training of the military force, so as to enable it to act in the field to meet such a contingency.
If, however, an enemy's vessels be permitted to enter Port Phillip, no land force, whatever degree of efficiency it had attained, could prevent their approaching within bombarding distance of the city and suburbs of Melbourne, and levying an enormous contribution. It cannot be sufficiently insisted on that the key to the defence of Melbourne is the exclusion of hostile vessels from Port Phillip. I pointed out, in 1877, how this can be effected; and I wish to draw your attention to the reasoning
I then advanced and the measures I proposed. There may be slight differences of detail in the carrying out of the scheme, but such minor considerations do not affect the general question.
I observe that the idea is started that, except during a gale from the south-east, 5,000 men- infantry and artillery-might be landed on the beach half-a-mile north-east of Point Lonsdale, and about 3,500 yards from the guns of Queenscliff! Imagine the unarmed vessels carrying the 5,000 men, after having been tossed over the "Rip," coolly anchoring under the fire of the 12-ton and 80-pr. rifled guns at Queenscliff and Port Nepean, not to mention that from the floating defences, and proceeding to disembark the forces, including artillery (which must, if it reached the shore, be dragged by hand through the sand), whilst the shore was swept by artillery fire, not only from the batteries, but from field artillery and riflemen acting from under cover. I verily believe that Victorian gunners, properly trained, would sink every one of the hostile transports; and I am sure that the attack, supposing for a moment that it could possibly be made, could not but result in the most signal failure.
It is stated that the Queenscliff Battery, and then the Swan Island Battery, may be taken by the enemy. It is, however, part of my scheme that the batteries should, by the measures which I have proposed, be made absolutely secure against assault. This can be done, and unquestionably should be done.
The work at Point Nepean, which would cross its fire with that from Queenscliff, and bring guns to bear on ships approaching and crossing the "Rip," if constructed on the plan I suggested, would be perfectly secure against capture. It is, moreover, essential that the fort for the defence of the South Channel should be constructed, and the armament for it provided. I observe that this work was commenced, but very little progress in its construction has been made. A plan for small cupolas has lately been proposed in England, which would, I think, be well adapted for this fort; it would enable you to adopt a smaller structure than that first proposed, and the work might thus be carried out at less cost than I originally estimated.
The torpedoes also, which are required to be placed in the channels and under the fire of the forts, should, and I hope soon will, be provided. I know it is stated by some that an enemy may remove torpedoes by means of countermines, but it is a fallacy to suppose that this can be done, especially under such conditions as those under which they would be applied in Port Phillip. As, however, I have always pointed out, artillery fire is essential to prevent the torpedo defences being removed.
I would strongly advise that the business connected with torpedoes should, as in New South Wales, be placed in the hands of gentlemen well versed in electrical science and in other matters relating to the application of submarine defences.
By the measures which I proposed the Colony of Victoria can render itself so absolutely secure against any attack that is at all likely to be made upon it, that it is a wonder to me that those measures have not been fully carried out. Why cannot the Government there take a small loan for defences, as was done on a large scale by Lord Palmerston for works of defence at home, and so insure that they shall be carried out without delay?
A large portion of the annual votes could then be applied to the training of the land forces, including a force of permanent artillery which is essential for the proper service of the batteries.
I may add, as pointed out in my Report of 1877, that when the permanent defences are constructed, and the torpedoes supplied, the annual expense in peace-time of maintaining the floating defences might be considerably reduced.
Believe me, &c. (Signed)
WM. F. DRUMMOND JERVOIS.
P.S. I wish particularly to draw your attention to the reasoning which I urged at pp. 12 and 13 of my Report of 1877, with regard to the much-vexed question of floating defences in lieu of forts and land batteries. The subject was generally discussed as if the adoption of the one were antagonistic to that of the other. We hear a good deal about forts versus floating batteries. The fact is, there is no versus in the matter. Both are required in their proper places. Though I have always urged, and still strongly insist upon, the necessity of the proposed forts for the defence of Port Phillip, I at the same time advocate the principle of combining with them, within proper limits, floating defences, whether in the form of an iron-clad, like the "Cerberus," of gun-boats, or of torpedo-vessels.
W. F. D. J.
Appendix No. 7.
AUSTRALIA.
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